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Introduction
As agricultural biotechnology has become an agronomic alternative, discussion has
emerged about what legal liabilities, if any, exists for those who create, distribute, and produce
transgenic seeds and crops. Many governments have debated legal liability as related to
agricultural biotechnology.1 This debate has also been informed by numerous commentators -academics from several disciplines, government lawyers, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations or industry. The authors of this article – a Canadian academic and
an American academic – have participated in this discussion about legal liability and agricultural
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For example, governmental bodies of New Zealand have produced several documents
on legal liability. In chronological order these documents are: Royal Commission on Genetic
Modification, Report, Chapter 12, “Liability Issues” (2001); Ministry of Research, Science &
Technology, Review of Chen, Palmer & Partners and Simon Terry Associates, Who Bears the
Risk? (Oct. 2001) available at www.morst.govt.nz/hot/biotechRCGM.html; NZ Law Commission
Report, “Liability for Loss Resulting from the Development, Supply or Use of Genetically
Modified Organisms” (May 2002); Ministry for the Environment, “Public Discussion Paper:
Improving the Operation of the HSNO Act for New Organisms,” Chapter 8 “Liability Issues”
(Sept. 2002) available at www.mfe.govt.nz; and Ministry for Environment, “Summary of
Submissions: Improving the Operation of the HSNO Act for New Organisms,” Chapter B8
“Liability Issues” (Feb. 2003) available at www.mfe.govt.nz.
2

biotechnology.2
To our knowledge, the published academic literature on this topic has primarily focused
on domestic law of particular nations3 with some discussion about liability proposals at the
international level.4
In this article, the authors hope to offer fresh insights on legal liability from comparative
law and international law perspectives. The article begins by comparing Canadian and American
legal liability regimes in agricultural biotechnology. Using this North American comparison as
background, the article then discusses liability issues by contrasting the statutory regimes from
Denmark and Germany. Once the comparisons and contrasts between Canadian, American,
Danish, and German law have been presented, the article focuses on the on-going discussion of
legal liability and agricultural biotechnology at the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) of the

2

S. SMYTH et al, REGULATING THE LIABILITIES OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
(CABI Pub. 2004), especially Chapter 2 “Innovation and Liability”that focuses on legal liability
issues; L. Khoury & S. Smyth, Reasonable Foreseeability and Liability in Relation to Genetically
Modified Organisms, 9th ICABR Int’l Conf. on Agric. Biotechnology (Ravello, Italy, July 2005);
and S. Smyth, A Decade of Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology Liability in Canada: A Case
Study from 1994-2004 (Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. of Saskatchewan, Jan. 2005).
D. Kershen, Legal Liability Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology, National Agricultural
Law Center Research Article (2002), www.nationalaglawcenter.org; D. Kershen, Proposed
Liability for Transgenic Crops, 10 (#2) Agric. Mngt. Newsletter 7 (ABA-SEER, Feb. 2006).
3

E.g., J. Glenn, Footloose: Civil Responsibility for GMO Gene Wandering in Canada,
43 WASHBURN L. J. 547 (2004); B. Endres, “GMO:” genetically modified organism or gigantic
monetary obligation? The liability schemes for GMO damage in the United States and the
European Union, 22 LOYOLA L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 453 (2000). Both these articles
provide a survey of the possible legal claims that might exist to establish legal liability related to
agricultural biotechnology.
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E.g., E. Duall (Note), A Liability and Redress Regime for Genetically Modified
Organism under the Cartagena Protocol, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173 (2004).
3

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (BSP).5 The authors posit that understanding the comparisons
and contrasts between Canada, the United States, Denmark, and Germany assists greatly in
understanding the issues and debates about legal liability and agricultural biotechnology at the
international level at the BSP negotiations.
By providing comparative descriptions of the legal liability regimes for agricultural
biotechnology in Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the United States, the authors desire to clarify
the quite different alternatives available to the participants in the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol
(BSP) negotiations. Moreover, by discussing and explaining the options facing the BSP
negotiators, the authors have confidence that policy-makers from the various nations should gain
a better understanding of how they might fashion domestic legal liability regimes to best fit their
own particular nations.
Legal Liability: Canada and the United States of America
In the Canadian and American legal systems, legal liability can be classified into three
general types: civil liability, administrative liability, and criminal liability.6
5

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (BSP) entered into force on 29 December 2003.
The Meeting of the Parties is the governing entity of the BSP. Article 27 titled “Liability and
Redress” states:
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall, at its first meeting, adopt a process with respect to the appropriate
elaboration of international rules and procedures in the field of liability and
redress for damage resulting from transboundary movements of living modified
organisms, analysing and taking due account of the ongoing processes in
international law in these matters, and shall endeavour to complete this process
within four years.”
6

For an excellent brief discussion of these three classifications, read R. Burnett-Hall,
Annex D – Liability for Damage Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: The Existing Law
in UK AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT BIOTECHNOLOGY COMMISSION REPORT (Nov. 2003),
especially pp. 125-129. Although this Annex D is for the United Kingdom, Canada and the
4

Civil Liability
Civil liability means that one person (plaintiff) brings a private claim for a legal remedy
(usually monetary damages, but at times for an injunction) against another person (defendant) by
claiming that the person or property of the plaintiff has suffered harm caused by the defendant.7
Thus, a Canadian or American plaintiff potentially could bring a private lawsuit against the
company that created a transgenic crop or a farmer who grew a transgenic crop claiming that the
plaintiff has suffered harm to her body, her land, or her crop caused by the transgenic crop of the
company or the farmer.
In both Canada and the United States, a plaintiff claiming civil liability harm caused by a
transgenic crop has several causes of action (torts) from which to choose for the legal pleadings
that formally present the case (plaintiff v. defendant) to the court. In both Canada and the United
States, the plaintiff can bring more than one cause of action in the same case, if the plaintiff has a
reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff can prove facts that establish each cause of action set

United States share a common heritage from the English legal system, including the tripartite
classification of legal liability.
7

Civil liability also encompasses one party (plaintiff) claiming private damages against
another party (defendant) caused by defendant’s infringement of the intellectual property rights
(e.g. trade secrets, plant variety certificates, patents) of the plaintiff. Although Canadian and
American intellectual property laws are similar, comparing the significant decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada with those of the Supreme Court of the United States also reveals
important differences. Compare Commissioner of Patents v. President and Fellows of Harvard
College, 2002 SCC 76 (patenting of living matter, higher life forms are not a patentable subject)
with Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (patenting of living matter, all life forms are
patentable subject) and compare Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2004 SCC 34 (genes and
cells of plants, but not the plants themselves, are patentable) with J.E.M. AgSupply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (genes, cells, and the plants themselves are
patentable). This article does not address the issues of civil liability arising from claims of
intellectual property infringement.
5

forth in the legal pleadings. In both Canada and the United States, a plaintiff’s possible causes of
action for damages suffered reflect the shared Common Law system of jurisprudence originating
in England. More specifically, the following four Common Law causes of action8 have received
the most attention in the academic literature9.
• Negligence.10 Negligence exists when a defendant fails to act as a reasonable person
would have acted in the factual situation and the defendant’s unreasonable conduct causes
damages to the person or property of the plaintiff. With respect to the negligent act alleged
against the defendant by the plaintiff, the courts examine three specific elements of the
negligence cause of action: defendant’s foreseeability of harm from defendant’s conduct (an act
or a failure to act); whether defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care; and, if a duty of care exists,
the standard of care that the law expects the defendant to honor in fulfilling that duty.

8

The authors give very brief descriptions of the four Common Law causes of action.
The authors have checked their brief descriptions for accuracy against widely-used one volume
treatises on torts in Canada and the United States, specifically G. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF TORTS
IN CANADA (2nd ed. 2002) and D. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS: HORNBOOK SERIES (2000).
However, the brief descriptions come from the authors, not the treatise writers who have devoted
many pages of careful detail to their discussions of each Common Law cause of action.
9

For Canada and United States, see the literature citations supra notes 2 & 3. For other
Common Law countries with emphasis also on the same four Common Law causes of action, see
M. Barber, Managing genetically modified crops in Australia: GM crops, segregation and
liability in Australian agriculture (Avcare, Sept. 2005), www.avcare.org.au; D. Dalton, Liability
Issues Associated with GM Crops for Australia, Dept. of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
(Sept. 2003); Peter Lloyd, Report of the Independent Reviewer to the Government of Victoria on
Market Impacts of Genetically Modified Canola and Industry Preparedness (Dec. 2003),
www.dpi.vic.gov.au/dpi/nrensr.nsf; for New Zealand, the citations supra note 1; (UK) R.
Burnett-Hall, supra note 6, esp. pp. 133-136 and D. Howarth, Civil liability for GM farming:
GM crops and the existing law, 12 ENVIR’L LIAB. 185 (2004).
10

G. FRIDMAN supra note 8, Ch. 12, The Tort of Negligence; D. DOBBS supra note 8,
Ch. 6, The Negligence Cause of Action.
6

Negligence is considered a fault-based cause of action because the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant was at fault for failing to act like a reasonable person – an objective standard of fault
as opposed to a subjective standard of fault.
• Trespass.11 Trespass involves the direct physical entry upon the property of plaintiff by
defendant or things (animals, equipment, substances, or particles) under defendant’s control.
Trespass exists against defendant from the act of direct entry, regardless of fault on the part of the
defendant. Plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages for the act of trespass itself. However, if the
plaintiff desires to gain an injunction or monetary (more than nominal) damages, the plaintiff
must prove a specific harm or specific injury from the act of trespass.
• Nuisance.12 Private nuisance involves the unreasonable interference by defendant’s
conduct with the plaintiff’s possessory use and enjoyment of her own land with emphasis more
on the plaintiff’s possessory use and enjoyment than on the defendant’s conduct. However, with
the emphasis on plaintiff’s possessory use and enjoyment, the plaintiff must be claiming a
reasonable use and enjoyment reflective of the character of the locality where plaintiff’s land lies
and reflective of what normal persons, as opposed to especially sensitive persons, may
reasonably expect from neighbors. Nuisance exists against defendant from the unreasonable
interference, regardless of fault on the part of the defendant. Nuisance is a cause of action in
which courts attempt to accommodate both plaintiff and defendant and to achieve a neighborly
coexistence.

11

G. FRIDMAN supra note 8, Ch. 3, Trespass – General Principles; D. DOBBS supra note
8, Ch. 4, Direct and Intentional Interference with Property.
12

G. FRIDMAN supra note 8, Ch. 8, Nuisance; D. DOBBS supra note 8, Ch. 34 Nuisance.
7

The Common Law also recognizes a public nuisance. Public nuisance exists when a
defendant engages in conduct that unreasonably interferes with a recognized public right (such as
the right of the public to access and to use a public highway). As a public nuisance interferes
with a public right, a public official (e.g. a Provincial or a State Attorney-General) ordinarily is
the proper party to bring a legal action against the defendant to abate the public nuisance. If an
individual plaintiff can show a specific, special damage from the public nuisance that is not
suffered by members of the general public, the individual plaintiff may have a legal claim for the
special, specific damages by using a public nuisance claim.13
• Strict Liability.14 Strict liability exists when a defendant brings or does something on
his land that is abnormally dangerous or not natural and the “abnormally dangerous” or “not
natural” something causes harm to the person or property of plaintiff. Strict liability exists
regardless of fault on the part of the defendant in order to make the defendant internalize the cost
of harms caused by defendant’s “abnormally dangerous” or “not natural” something. Although
Canada and the United States have similar strict liability doctrines, Canadian jurisprudence
seems to place more emphasis in its case law upon the foundational precedent of Rylands v.
Fletcher15 and its implications so that strict liability may at times be called The Rule of Rylands

13

G. FRIDMAN, supra note 8, Ch. 8 Nuisance at 8.8 Private Actions for Public Nuisance;
D. DOBBS, supra note 8, Ch. 24, § 467 Public Nuisance. For a law review article that
emphasizes the public nuisance claim in the agricultural biotechnology context, T. Redick & G.
Bernstein, Nuisance Law the Prevention of “Genetic Pollution”: Declining a Dinner Date with
Damocles, 30 ENV’L L. REPT. 10328 (2000).
14

G. FRIDMAN supra note 8, Ch. 9, Strict Liability for Dangerous Things; D. DOBBS
supra note 8, Ch. 23, Strict Liability for Animals, Abnormal Conditions, and Special Dangers.
15

(1866), L.R. 1 Ex. 265, aff’d (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330. In Rylands v. Fletcher,
defendant built a pond on his land which ultimately broke into mining shafts beneath defendant’s
8

v. Fletcher.16
Using these four Common Law causes of action, several potential scenarios for damage
claims exist. Reported decisions of various courts of Canada and the United States have
addressed several of these scenarios. Reported decisions do not exist for all the potential
scenarios but other information makes it possible to sensibly comment about liability in these
scenarios in Canada and the United States, even without the existence of reported decisions. To
our knowledge, there are no reported decisions (and no filed cases) where the parties to the
lawsuit are farmer against farmer.17 The reported decisions all involve a claim against a
developer of transgenic seed.
Scenario One: Claim for damages arising from an unapproved transgenic crop mixing
with commercial agricultural crops.
The United States has had one situation – StarLink™– in which reported decisions have
dealt with legal liability arising from an unapproved transgenic crop commingling with
commercial agricultural crops. StarLink™ was a transgenic corn approved for animal feed and
ethanol production, but not approved for human food.18 When StarLink™ became commingled
with corn for human food, farmers and elevators filed lawsuits against Aventis Cropscience

land and thereby flooded the plaintiff’s mine. The English courts held the defendant liable to
plaintiff for damages to the mine caused by this indirect, unintended escape of water.
16

Compare G. FRIDMAN, supra note 8 pp. 217-237 (discussing the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher) with D. DOBBS supra note 8 pp. 950-952 (discussing the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher).
17

B. Endres, Revising Seed Purity Laws to Account for the Adventitious Presence of
Genetically Modified Varieties: A First Step Towards Coexistence, 1 J. FOOD L. & POLICY 131,
135 & 138 (2005).
18

In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 211 F. Sup.2d 1060, 1062 (N.D. Ill.

2002).
9

USA, the developer.19 The numerous law suits were consolidated into a single class action
lawsuit in the United States Federal Court for the Northern District of Illinois.20
In the legal proceedings that followed, the trial judge ultimately ruled that plaintiffs who
could prove that their crop or stored grain had been physically contaminated21 by unapproved
StarLink™ – making their crops and grain unmarketable as food corn because adulterated by an
unapproved substance22 – had a viable legal claim through negligence, private nuisance, and
public nuisance.23 After these rulings, the parties to the litigation reached a settlement of the
legal claims.24
Although the Canadian courts have not faced a Scenario One factual situation, the
similarity between the successful causes of action in the StarLink™ litigation to Canadian
Common Law causes of action make it quite likely that Canadian courts would reach a similar
result.
Scenario Two. Claim for damages arising from an approved transgenic crop mixing with

19

Id. at 1064.

20

In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 212 F. Supp.2d. 828, 833 (N.D. Ill.

21

Id. at 842-843.

22

Id. at 835.

2002).

23

Id. at 852. The trial court also recognized a possible claim under a state (Tennessee)
consumer protection statute.
24

In Re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, Proposed Settlement and Fairness
Hearing Document at p. 3, MDL Docket No. 1403, (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2003) (proposed settlement
of $100 million in principal plus accrued interest); T. Redick, Stewardship for Biotech Crops:
Strategies for Improving Global Consumer Confidence, 44 JURIMETICS 5, 23-26 (2003)
(discussing the StarLink™ case and reporting a settlement for $110 million).
10

non-transgenic crops resulting in a loss of a premium for a person or company who intended to
sell a non-transgenic commodity or food product.
There are no reported Canadian or American cases addressing issues that would be raised
by a Scenario Two fact pattern. There are likely several reasons why Scenario Two fact patterns
have not come before the Canadian and American courts.
First, Scenario Two is most likely to involve a premium price related to tolerance levels
for the legal requirement to label a product as “genetically modified.” Although the European
Union’s 0.9% standard for labeling are difficult to meet, these tolerance standards may not
require farmers to adopt agronomic practices significantly different that those farmers presently
use, at least for maize, cotton, and sugar beet.25 Moreover, a Scenario Two situation related to
labeling requirements does not exist in the domestic markets of Canada and the United States
because there are no laws requiring transgenic ingredients or foods to bear a “genetically
modified” label.

25

G. Brookes & P. Barfoot, Co-existence of GM and non GM arable crops: the non GM
and organic context in the EU (May 2004). Brookes and Barfoot write, “The evidence to date
shows that non GM crops growing commercially in the EU and in North America have coexisted with conventional and organic crops without economic and commercial problems – only
isolated instances have been reported of adventitious presence of GMOs occurring in organic
crops, even in North America where GM crops dominate production of soybeans, maize and
canola.” Id. at 3.
W. Weber & T. Bringezu, Test of coexistence under German field conditions – results
from the “Erprobungsanbau” 2004 with Bt-maize, Proc. 2nd Int’l Conf. on Co-Existence between
GM and non-GM based agricultural supply chains 327, 329 (Montpellier, Nov 2005) (Table 2, by
using a 20 meters separation distance between transgenic and non-transgenic fields, the
adventitious presence in the non-transgenic field was below the European threshold (0.9%) for
labeling at all 27 farm locations). See also, European Commission, Joint Research Centre
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, New case studies on the coexistence of GM and
non-GM crops in European agriculture (2006) and European Commission Joint Research Centre
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, Scenarios for co-existence of genetically
modified, conventional and organic crops in European agriculture (2002).
11

Second, the conventional legal rule is that a person who signs a contract promising to
satisfy product quality specifications is the person who bears the costs and the responsibilities to
fulfill those voluntarily accepted specifications. The person who seeks a premium by promising
product quality specifications must earn that premium.26
Leaving aside the premium paid for organic products, the evidence is thin that markets
pay a premium price for non-organic, non-transgenic farm products. The demand for nonorganic, non-transgenic farm products exists to satisfy international markets but it is not clear
that the demand translates into a price premium.27
While these three reasons may explain why Canadian and American courts have not faced

26

G. Brookes & P. Barfoot, Co-existence in North American agriculture: can GM crops
be grown with conventional and organic crops? (June 2004). Brookes and Barfoot write,
“Overall, co-existence of GM and non GM, including organic, crops have been occurring in
North America. ... In effect there has been recognition that if producers wish to avoid GM events
in their production systems the onus for implementing measures to facilitate this falls on the
specialty producers (including organic) which are, in turn rewarded via price premia for incurring
costs associated with meeting requirements of their customers and certification bodies.” Id. at 4.
Report of the Working Group of the Department of Agriculture and Food, Coexistence of
GM and non-GM Crops in Ireland, Ch. 8 Economic loss, liability and redress (Sept. 2005),
www.agriculture.gov.ie. The Irish Working Group wrote, “Where non-GM crop growers
voluntarily choose to impose additional or stricter requirements on their production systems over
and above the legal minimum, in order to gain market or price advantage, then non-GM crop
growers are responsible for ensuring those requirements are met and for meeting their associated
costs, if any.” Id. at 119. See also, Endres Revising Seed Purity Laws, supra note 17 at 135-137.
(agreeing that historically the specialty producer, including organic producers, must bear the cost
of meeting voluntarily accepted contract specifications for product standards).
27

G. Brookes & P. Barfoot, Co-existence ... in the EU, supra note 25 at pp. 6-7 shows at
the farm gate “very little development of a price differential” between conventional and
transgenic crops. See also, G Brookes, N. Craddock, B. Kniel, The EU non-GM Market:
Labelling requirements, market dynamics and cost implications for the EU feed and food supply
chains (Sept. 2005); Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (Australian
Government), Global Responses to GM Food Technology (Feb. 2005) at pp. ix, 45, & 46 states
“Where price premiums for non-GM varieties exist they are small ...”
12

Scenario Two situations, these three reasons also hint at the difficulty that plaintiffs may have in
proving the elements of negligence, trespass, nuisance, and strict liability and, particularly, the
existence of economic damages. But exactly how Canadian and American courts would resolve
legal claims for Scenario Two situations is presently unknown because no reported cases opine
on these issues.
Scenario Three. Claim for damages arising from an approved transgenic crop mixing
with organic crops resulting in a loss of the organic label for the specific organic crop or of
organic certification for the organic farmer’s farm.28
There are no reported decisions in Canada or the United States addressing issues that
would be raised by a Scenario Three fact pattern. However, a straightforward answer explains
why – no organic farmer has lost certification for products or farm due to the adventitious
presence29 of transgenic material.
In Canada, Saskatchewan organic farmers filed a class action lawsuit against transgenic
seed developers30 that relate to Scenarios Four and Five to be discussed shortly. In early
pleadings, however, the plaintiffs sought to prove the Scenario Three fact pattern. The plaintiffs
abandoned the effort because they could present no proof that any organic farmers had lost
organic certification.31 Canadian organic certification bodies have also indicated that organic

28

M. Migus, GMO Statutory Liability Regimes: An International Review (Canadian
Institute for Environmental Law and Policy, 2004) (suggesting Scenarios One, Two, and Three).
29

Adventitious presence means the inadvertent presence of transgenic seeds or other
material in conventional and organic crops. CAST Commentary QTA2005-1 on Adventitious
Presence (July 2005).
30

Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada, Inc., 2005 SKQB 225.

31

Id. at ¶ 218.
13

farmers will not lose organic certification for adventitious presence of transgenic crops.32
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) confirmed to National Association
of State Departments of Agriculture that no organic farmer had lost organic certification for the
adventitious presence of transgenic material.33 Moreover, the USDA-National Organic Program
(NOP) regulations make it clear that organic products and farms would lose certification only if
the organic farmer intentionally used transgenic material or failed to take reasonable precautions
to avoid transgenic material. Organic farmers who abide by their approved organic production
plans by so doing produce organic products regardless of the adventitious presence of transgenic
material.34
Canada does not have national organic standards by law. The United States does have
national organic standards by law and implementing regulations. Yet both the Canadian and
American approaches to organic certification are very similar. Organic agriculture is a set of
production standards and not product standards. Consequently, an organic farmer who follows
an approved production plan produces organic products on an organic farm regardless of
adventitious presence of transgenic material. Hence, in Canada and the United States there will
be no legal claim for Scenario Three fact patterns because these fact patterns involve adventitious

32

K. Briere, Organic Grower will keep certification, THE WESTERN PRODUCER (Sept. 8,
2003); The Conseil d’accréditation du Québec, Press Release on launches organic/GMO
investigation (8 Sept. 2003) (indicating that the organic certification requires that organic
producers must not intentionally use transgenic materials and take precautions to avoid negligent
contamination).
33

USDA-NOP letter to National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (Dec.

21, 2004).
34

USDA-NOP Final Rules 2002 at pp. 33-35 available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/nop/NOP/standards/FullText.pdf.
14

presence that does not adversely affect organic certification.
Scenario Four. Claim for damages arising from the loss of market access. For example,
where a buyer decides against buying a farmer’s crop even though there was no evidence of
transgenic material or the evidence of transgenic material was below legally-set thresholds.
Scenario Five. Claim for damages arising from a decision by a farmer to forgo planting a
particular crop because of concern about proximity to transgenic crops or market perception
about transgenic crops.35
Scenarios Four and Five are grouped together because they share the following common
characteristics: lack of physical damage to the plaintiff’s property; the claims relate to
disappointed commercial expectations; and the plaintiff and defendant are relational strangers
who, therefore, have not allocated risks between themselves in a contractual relationship. In
factual situations sharing these characteristics, tort law has often denied recovery because the
potential plaintiffs are an unnumbered, unbounded group whose damage claims would be
speculative and limitless because dependent on third party (customer, market) behaviors. The
rubric applied to these situations in Canadian and American law is the “pure economic loss”
doctrine.36
35

UK AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT BIOTECHNOLOGY COMMISSION REPORT: GM
CROPS? COEXISTENCE AND LIABILITY (Nov. 2003) at p. 4 suggesting Scenarios Four and Five.
[hereafter UK REPORT: GM Crops?].
36

The discussion of pure economic loss in the text is a summary of the discussion of pure
economic loss in a transgenic crop context from In re StarLink Corn Products Liability
Litigation, 212 F. Supp.2d 828, 838-843 (N.D. Ill. 2002). (The StarLink™ trial judge ruled that
the pure economic loss doctrine did not apply because the plaintiffs had alleged adequate proof
of physical damage to plaintiff’s crops.) For discussion of pure economic loss in Canadian torts,
G. Fridman, supra note 8 at pp. 373-383. In Professor Fridman’s discussion of pure economic
loss for Canadian torts, he also discusses the same doctrine in the jurisprudence of Australia,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
For a thorough discussion of pure economic loss in multiple jurisdictions, E. BANAKAS
(ed.), CIVIL LIABILITY FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS (Kluwer Law Int’l, 1996). The Banakas book
has chapters, among others, on pure economic loss in three of the four jurisdictions
comparatively discussed in this article: Canada (Ch. 6), the United States of America (Ch. 5),
15

There are three reported cases in Canadian and American jurisprudence that present
Scenario Four and Scenario Five fact patterns.
In Canada, Saskatchewan organic farmers brought a class action on behalf of all organic
grain farmers in the province against Bayer Cropscience, Inc. and Monsanto Canada, Inc. for
damages arising from the commercialization of transgenic canola.37 Although the plaintiffs at
first focused on loss of organic certification (Scenario Three),38 the plaintiffs refocused their
claims to concentrate on loss of the European market39 for organic canola (Scenario Four) and the
loss to organic farmers of the practical option to choose to grow organic canola (Scenario Five).40
In addition while refocusing the lawsuit, the plaintiffs added a claim for damages for removal of
volunteer transgenic canola growing on their lands.41

and Germany (Ch. 3). The Banakas book does not have a chapter on pure economic loss in
Danish law. Although the Banakas book was published ten years ago, other information and
research gives the authors of this article substantial confidence that the discussions on pure
economic loss in the Banakas book continue to be accurate about the current state of the law in
Canada, the United States and Germany.
37

Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada, Inc., 2005 SKQB 225 at ¶ 1.

38

Read the text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.

39

Hoffman at ¶ 218.

40

Hoffman at ¶ 219.

41

Hoffman at ¶ 220. Louise Schmeiser also filed a claim for costs of removing volunteer
transgenic canola from her organic garden against Monsanto Canada, Inc. Mrs. Schmeiser
sought ZC 140 in damages. Pat Peckover, Supreme Court Duo Battle in Small Claims Court,
HUMBOLDT JOURNAL (March 31, 2005). After trial proceedings, the Provincial Court of
Saskatchewan ruled that Mrs. Schmeiser had failed to prove her claims and dismissed the case.
Louise Schmeiser and Monsanto Canada Inc., Provincial Court of Saskatchewan (Humboldt) #
18/04, ¶ 51 (15 June 2005) (copy of opinion in possession of authors).
16

In a lengthy opinion,42 Judge G.A. Smith discussed and ruled upon each of plaintiff’s
plead causes of action: negligence,43 the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,44 nuisance,45 trespass,46 and
three environmental claims based on Saskatchewan statutes.47
With respect to the negligence claim, Judge Smith denied the claim giving three reasons.
First, the plaintiffs did not plead facts showing that it was foreseeable that markets would reject
organic products or that farmers would decline to grow organic grains due to adventitious
presence of transgenic material.48 Second and more serious, the plaintiffs had not alleged
adequate relational proximity – i.e. expectations/reliance/communicated representations, or any
physical damage to property, or a special relationship between the parties.49 Third, even if the
first two reasons could be overcome, policy reasons related to pure economic loss would bar
recovery under a negligence claim.50 As Judge Smith wrote,

42

The Hoffman opinion consists of 340 paragraphs and is 100+ pages in print. The
authors provide only a brief discussion, focused on particular paragraphs, of this complex,
detailed opinion.
43

Hoffman at ¶¶ 37-88.

44

Hoffman at ¶¶ 89-97.

45

Hoffman at ¶¶ 98-124.

46

Hoffman at ¶¶ 125-133.

47

Hoffman at ¶¶ 134-193. The authors discuss these environmental claims later in this
article under the heading of Legal Liability: Canada and the United States of America
Administrative Liability.
48

Hoffman at ¶¶ 64-66.

49

Hoffman at ¶¶ 67-70.

50

Hoffman at ¶¶ 71-80.
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“It is my conclusion that the case before me does not present a
situation in which the courts would extend the categories for
recovery of pure economic loss, for all the policy reasons
traditionally cited in support of the exclusion of this recovery
(liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to
an indeterminate class) are in play in the case.”51
With respect to the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, Judge Smith opined that the companies
would be liable only if an escape of a substance came from property owned or controlled by the
companies. The judge ruled that a commercial release of the approved transgenic crop is not
reasonably arguable as such an escape.52
With respect to nuisance, Judge Smith ruled that there were no allegations that transgenic
canola was harmful per se or made organic canola unfit for consumption or that the transgenic
seed developers has failed to conform to requirements for commercial release. Hence, the judge
concluded that there was no evidentiary support for a finding that “defendants substantially
caused the nuisance (interference with certified organic grain farmers’ use and enjoyment of their
land) alleged.”53

51

Hoffman at ¶ 80 with parenthetical insert from ¶ 73.
As for the general Canadian law on pure economic loss, Bruce Feldthusen, Dean of the
University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, wrote in concluding remarks to his Canadian chapter in the
Banakas book as follows: “In summary, the Canadian position on relational loss is totally
uncertain, both because of the unusual split among the judges, and because of the inherent
uncertainty in the judgment of McLachlan J. [in CNR v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co.]. I would
predict that the majority of relational loss claims will continue to fail, but that considerable time
will be wasted litigating supposedly special cases of proximity.” B. Feldthusen, The Recovery of
Pure Economic Loss in Canada: Proximity, Justice, Rationality and Chaos, Ch. 6 at 147 in E.
BANAKAS supra note 36. See also, Joost Blom, Tort, Contract and the Allocation of Risk, 17
S.C.L.R.2d 189 (2002) (“Pure economic loss, while certainly an area of growth in the last four
decades, remains the exception.” Id. at 290.)
52

Hoffman at ¶ 97.

53

Hoffman at ¶¶ 121-122 with parenthetical insert from ¶ 98.
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With respect to trespass, plaintiffs alleged that the commercial release of transgenic
canola set in motion the events leading to transgenic canola pollen or transgenic canola
volunteers eventually reaching plaintiffs’ organic farmlands.54 Judge Smith ruled that this chain
of events did not constitute the direct, with emphasis on the word “direct,” physical entry
required by the trespass cause of action.55
In the United States growers of conventional soybeans (plaintiffs) and corn filed a class
action lawsuit against transgenic seed developers (Monsanto Company, Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Inc., and Syngenta, Inc.) pleading public nuisance and negligence and alleging
damages to conventional markets because of the commercial release of transgenic crops.56
Plaintiffs abandoned claims of direct physical injury to their crops and instead alleged only loss
of markets due to concerns about commingling (actual or perceived) between conventional and
transgenic soybeans and corn in marketing channels.57
In the opinion granting a summary dismissal of plaintiff’s tort claims, Judge Sippel
applied the pure economic loss doctrine to both the public nuisance and negligence causes of
action.58 Judge Sippel distinguished the Sample tort claims from the StarLink™ tort claims

54

Hoffman at ¶ 128.

55

Hoffman at ¶ 133.

56

Sample v. Monsanto Co., 283 F. Supp.2d 1088, 1090 (E.D. Mo. 2003).

57

Sample at 1091-1093.

58

Sample at 1093-1094. Applying the pure economic loss doctrine to negligence is
consonant with Canadian jurisprudence. Applying the pure economic loss doctrine to nuisance,
including public nuisance, is a broader use of the doctrine in American jurisprudence than may
be so from the case precedents of Canadian jurisprudence.
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precisely because the Sample plaintiffs did not claim direct physical injury to their personal
crops.59 Judge Sippel followed the StarLink™ opinion’s discussion of the pure economic loss
doctrine60 to emphasize that the doctrine would bar claims solely for loss of market access.61
The Sample decision barring recovery for Scenarios Four and Five has received indirect
support in a subsequent StarLink™ litigation opinion. In Agra Marke, Inv. v. Aventis
Cropscience USA LP,62 Agra Marke claimed damages for loss of a premium for conventional
corn and asserted that its damages were covered by the StarLink™ settlement.63
In deciding Agra Marke, Judge Moran determined that Agra Marke’s claim related to
conventional corn that became commingled with StarLink™ corn only after the conventional corn
was sold and entered the stream of commerce for the international market.64 Judge Moran ruled
that the StarLink™ settlement applied to those whose crops had suffered direct physical injury

59

Sample at 1093.

60

For the StarLink opinion’s discussion of pure economic loss, read supra note 36.

61

Sample at 1093-1094.
As for the general American law on pure economic loss, Professor Gary Schwartz began
his chapter in the Banakas book by stating, “The first section of this chapter describes the leading
issues in American tort law since 1960 that bear on tort recoveries for economic loss. It shows
that the traditional rule denying recovery for the negligent infliction of economic loss – though it
has been subject to a variety of challenges – has held up reasonably well.” G. Schwartz, The
Economic Loss Doctrine in American Tort Law: Assessing the Recent Experience, Ch. 5 at 103
in E. BANAKAS supra note 36.
62

2005 WL 327020 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (not reported in the official reporter of federal
decisions).
63

Id. at *2.

64

Id. at *4.
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while owned by the claimant65 and, therefore, ruled that Agra Marke had no claim under the
StarLink™ settlement.66 Implied in Judge Moran’s ruling is that the pure economic loss doctrine
bars recovery for claims related to loss of access to international markets. Judge Moran had
foreshadowed (but not predetermined) the Agra Marke ruling in his StarLink opinion when he
decided that no legally viable claim would exist for those who claimed harm to property
“because the corn was commingled after they had relinquished their ownership interest in it.”67
Taking into account the Hoffman case68 in Canada and the Sample and Agra Marke cases
in the United States, Scenarios Four and Five are unlikely to be legally viable claims using
Common Law causes of action in Canadian and American courts.
Administrative Liability
Whereas civil liability is liability flowing from litigation between private parties asserting
private claims, administrative liability is liability flowing from legislatively enacted regulatory
statutes. In the enacted regulatory statues, the legislature delegates administrative duties,
including enforcement, to specified administrative agencies. Within a particular regulatory
statute, the legislature may allow private citizens to initiate legal actions to enforce the regulatory
statute against private persons alleged to be violating the statute. However, administrative

65

Id. at *3.

66

Id. at *4.

67

In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 212 F. Supp.2d 828, 842 (N.D. Ill.

2002).
68

On August 30, 2005, the Hoffman plaintiffs (organic farmers) were granted the right to
appeal to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 2005 SKCA
105.
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liability is primarily a public liability – i.e. liability for harms to the public caused by violation of
the regulatory statute that are enforced by a governmental agency. The public harms that are
most often mentioned in the debate about agricultural biotechnology are claimed impacts on the
environment and on biodiversity.69
Administrative regulation of agricultural biotechnology at the federal level in Canada can
best be expressed by quoting from an official document::
The Government of Canada considers that the use of
existing Acts ... has value and a number of advantages over
redrafting legislation to address technological advances such as
new techniques of biotechnology. ... Accordingly, it has instituted
regulatory assessment processes based on sound science and the
generally accepted premise that it is the product itself, rather than
the technology or process, that should trigger the need for
regulation.70
When focusing on products, Canada regulates all plants and food products that are deemed to
have novel traits. In other words, novel traits in plants or foods triggers regulatory review by
whatever process the plant or the food acquired the novel trait. Plants with novel traits can be
produced by genetic engineering, mutagenesis or can be plants not previously grown in Canada.71
The regulation of products of biotechnology in Canada most predominately falls into the

69

M. Migus, supra note 28.

70

Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Response of the Federal Departments and
Agencies to the Petition Filed May 9, 2000 by the Sierra Legal Defence Fund under the Auditor
General Act: Review of Federal Laws, Regulations and Policies on Genetically Modified
Organisms, ¶ 61 (2000) available at
www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/biotech/enviro/sierrae.shtml [hereafter Response to Petition].
71

Id. at ¶¶ 15, 18.
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domain of two different agencies of government.72 The Canadian Food Inspection Agency
(CFIA), using the Seeds Act, Feeds Act, Fertilizers Act, Plant Protection Act, and the Health of
Animals Act, regulates for environmental assessment (including biodiversity) and for livestock
feed safety assessment for all plants with novel traits (PNTs).73 Health Canada is responsible for
human health and safety in relation to food biotechnology and does this through the Food and
Drugs Act and Pest Control Products Act.74 This includes all novel foods produced through
genetic engineering and that are intended for human consumption.
The federal Canadian regulatory system and the federal American regulatory system have
three significant traits in common. Both focus on product, not process, though the Canadian
system regulates more broadly than the American because the Canadian system regulates all
novel plants and foods. Both use existing regulatory statutes and agencies rather than creating a
specialized statutory and administrative regime for agricultural biotechnology. Both use sound
science (scientific rationality) as an underpinning policy orientation towards the regulation of

72

Two other federal agencies of the Government of Canada – the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans, and Environment Canada – also have regulatory obligations related to
biotechnology. However, these two agencies have not yet had to become active in their
regulatory obligations. Id. at Table 1 and ¶¶ 35-39. Three other federal agencies of the
Government of Canada – Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Natural Resources Canada, and
Industry Canada – have no regulatory authority regarding biotechnology but these three agencies
do provide expertise and advice to those agencies with direct regulatory obligations. Id. at Table
1 and ¶¶ 40-44.
73

Id. at ¶¶ 86 & 89. See also, CFIA, Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology in Canada:
An Overview, available at www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/biotech/reg/bioage.shtml; CFIA,
Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology in Canada: Environmental Questions, available at
www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/biotech/enviro/envrege.shtml.
74

Response to Petition supra note 70 at ¶¶ 29-31.
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agricultural biotechnology.75
In addition to the federal Canadian regulatory system, the Province of Saskatchewan has
enacted three environmental statutes that have been applied to transgenic crops in the reported
decision (previously discussed) of Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada Inc.76
With regard to the Environmental Management and Protection Act of 1983-84,77 the
statute allows any person “a right of compensation from (a) the owner of the pollutant or the
person having control of the pollutant for loss or damage incurred as a result of: (i) the discharge
of a pollutant; ... without proof of fault, negligence or wilful intent.”78 In applying this statutory
language to transgenic canola, Judge Smith considered the definitions of the words “discharge,”
“environment,” “owner of a pollutant,” “person having control of a pollutant,” “pollutant,” and
“pollution.”79 After discussing the pleadings and the definitions, Judge Smith concluded:

75

S. MacLauglin (Note), Food for the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis of Regulations
for Genetically Engineered Food in the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 14
INDIANA INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 375 (2003); G. Isaac & J. Hobbs, GM Food Regulations:
Canadian Debates, 3 ISUMA 105 (Autumn 2002) available at
www.isuma.net/vo3no2/isaac/isaac_e.pdf.
76

Hoffman at ¶¶ 134-193. For previous discussion of the Hoffman case in this article,
read text related to Scenarios Four and Five under the Civil Liability heading of Legal Liability:
Canada and the United States of America.
Canada also has a federal Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) that has
several liability provisions. However, the liability sections of the CEPA appear to relate to toxic
substances, international air pollution, and international water pollution. It is unlikely that
transgenic crops, particularly if approved for commercial release in Canada, would be listed as
substances within the liability provisions of the CEPA. S.C. 1999 c. 33 §§ 1-355.1.
77

SASK. ST. 1983-84, c. E-10.2 (hereafter EMPA 83/84).

78

EMPA 83/84 § 13(3) quoted in Hoffman at ¶ 137.

79

Hoffman at ¶¶ 137-158.
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“It is my conclusion that, even if the plaintiffs were permitted to
amend the statement of claim once again to assert facts sufficient
to provide some support to the allegation that GM canola is
inherently harmful or unsafe and is a “pollutant” within the
meaning of the Act, the facts alleged in the statement of claim still
would not be sufficient in law to sustain a claim under s. 13 of the
EMPA, for they do not reasonably support the conclusion that the
defendants owned or controlled the “pollutants” at the time they
were discharged into the environment. At best, the action would
lie against farmers who cultivate GM canola.”80
Beginning in 2002, Saskatchewan adopted a new Environmental Management and
Protection Act (EMPA 2002).81 Under EMPA 2002, the word “substance” replaced the word
“pollutant” and other relevant definitions (the responsible persons, loss and damages,
environment) were substantially broadened.82 With these changes, Judge Smith ruled that
plaintiffs had pled sufficient facts to state a claim under EMPA 2002.83 However, plaintiffs’
success has significance primarily for future commercial releases of transgenic crops because
Judge Smith also ruled, as conceded by plaintiffs, that EMPA has no retroactive effect.84
Without retroactive effect, plaintiffs did not have any claim for loss of markets because the loss
of markets, if any, occurred prior to 2002.85 Consequently, the plaintiffs can recover, if

80

Hoffman at ¶ 158.

81

SASK. ST. 2002, c. E-10.21 (hereafter EMPA 2002).

82

Hoffman at ¶¶ 162-163. In light of these broadened definitions, Judge Smith stated
that “the scope for potential liability imposed, on a literal reading of this section, is staggering”
and could include even kindly, gentle, favorable, and beneficial environmental effects. Id. at ¶
163.
83

Hoffman at ¶ 168.

84

Hoffman at ¶ 169.

85

Id.
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ultimately successful legally and factually at trial proceedings, only for “alleged clean-up costs
related to the presence of volunteer GM canola found on the land of organic farmers after the Act
came into effect.”86
In the Hoffman case, the plaintiffs also plead causes of action under the Environmental
Assessment Act87 (EAA) that allows a civil liability remedy to a private person “who suffers loss,
damage, or injury as a result of the development [that has not received provincial ministerial
approval] and that ... person is not required to prove negligence or intention to inflict loss,
damage or injury.”88 Judge Smith ruled that the plaintiffs could try to prove that the commercial
release of transgenic canola was a “development” that “caused widespread public concern
because of potential environmental changes” or that through cross-pollination was a “significant
impact” on plant life in the environment.89 Judge Smith ruled that the plaintiffs had pled
sufficient facts to establish a cause of action under the EAA, but whether the cause of action will
result in provable monetary damages payable by the defendants is subject to subsequent, further
trial proceedings.90
In the United States, three federal agencies share the administrative duties related to

86

Id.

87

SASK. ST. 1979-80, c. E-10.1, as amended 1983, c. 77; 1988-89, c. 42; and 1996, c.F-

88

Hoffman at ¶ 171.

89

Hoffman at ¶ 191.

19.1.

90

Hoffman at ¶ 192. In a later part of the Hoffman opinion, Judge Smith ruled that
plaintiffs could not pursue their two allowed environmental claims through a class action lawsuit.
Each plaintiff would have to file an individual lawsuit to pursue claims for damages unique to
each plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 191-192.
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agricultural biotechnology.91 The United States Department of Agriculture regulates transgenic
crops for their agronomic properties related to whether or not a particular transgenic crop poses a
plant pest or noxious weed risk that could harm other crops, the environment, or public health.92
The Food and Drug Administration regulates transgenic crops as food or feed for the purpose of
determining the safety of these crops when consumed by humans or animals.93 The
Environmental Protection Agency regulates transgenic crops that possess pesticidal qualities94 to
assure that the transgenic crop will grow “without unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment.”95
In the United States, the federal legislature has not enacted any special regulatory statute
specifically targeted towards biotechnology, including agricultural biotechnology. Moreover, in
the United States, the federal legislature has not enacted any administrative liabilities uniquely
applicable to agricultural biotechnology for potential damages to the environment or to

91

For an overview of the regulatory system for agricultural biotechnology through
USDA-Biotechnology Regulatory Services (BRS), read the fact sheets at
www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/biotechnology. Two fact sheets – “Biotechnology, Federal
Regulation, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture” and “National Environmental Policy Act
and Its Role in USDA’s Regulation of Biotechnology” – specifically discuss the BRS
consideration of environmental impacts, including issues related to threatened and endangered
species, by the preparation of either an Environmental Assessment (EA) or an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) as part of the regulatory process.
For an overview of the entire regulatory system for agricultural biotechnology in the
United States, D. Uchtmann, StarLink™ – A Case Study of Agricultural Biotechnology
Regulation 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159, 160-174 (2002).
92

Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772 (2005).

93

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (2005).

94

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2005).

95

Id. at § 136a(c)(5).
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biodiversity. While there have been administrative actions related to agricultural biotechnology
in the United States – the StarLink™ matter being the most prominent96 – obviously no reported
decisions exist in the United States about agricultural biotechnology and administrative liability
for allegations of environmental or biodiversity harms because no statutory provisions authorize
claims related to environmental or biodiversity once transgenic crops receive regulatory approval
for commercialization.97
Criminal Liability
Criminal liability means that the sovereign, through a public prosecutor, brings charges
against a person (the criminal defendant) that the criminal defendant has violated public penal
law(s). If convicted of the charges, Canadian and American criminal defendants ordinarily suffer
punishment through fines and imprisonment. To our knowledge, there are no Canadian or
American criminal statutes, independent of administrative statutes already described,98 that are

96

D. Uchtmann, supra note 91 provides a detailed history.

97

In the United States, there have been lawsuits seeking to reverse administrative
decisions authorizing the commercial release of transgenic crops. But these lawsuits are against
the administrative agencies challenging the decision to allow commercial release. E.g. Geertson
Farms Inc. v. Johanns, Case No. _____ (N.D. Calif. 2006) (lawsuit seeking to overturn the
UDSA decision deregulating transgenic alfalfa). These lawsuits are not against the developers or
users of the transgenic crop. After administrative approval, there are no administrative liability
provisions that apply against the users of the approved transgenic crops on environmental or
biodiversity grounds.
98

Regulatory statutes ordinarily contain provisions authorizing the competent
administrative agency to impose sanctions upon regulated parties when those regulated parties
fail to abide by regulatory obligations. However, these administrative sanctions are for
administrative non-compliance and are not sanctions about the regulated parties’ conduct per se.
For example, administrative agencies can seek sanctions for discharge of a pollutant without a
regulatory permit. The sanction is for the non-compliance with the regulatory obligation to
obtain a permit; the sanction is not for the discharge per se because the discharge itself may be
legally and socially proper if the regulated party had obtained the appropriate permit. By
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uniquely applicable to those who create, sell, or use transgenic crops. Moreover, to our
knowledge, the federal and provincial governments of Canada and the federal and state
governments of the United States have shown no significant inclination to utilize criminal
liability as a form of legal liability with respect to agricultural biotechnology.99 Persons
(individual or corporate) who are engaged in agricultural biotechnology have no greater or lesser
risk of criminal liability for their agricultural activities than corporate or individual persons
engaged in conventional and organic agriculture are at risk of criminal liability for their
agricultural activities.
Legal Liability: Denmark
Beginning in 2002, the Danish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (DFAF)
established a working group to address issues of coexistence between conventional, organic, and

contrast, criminal liability is a sanction against the conduct per se. This distinction between
administrative sanctions and criminal liability is nicely made in the Report of the Working Group
for the Government of Ireland supra note 26 at 123.
99

One American and one British commentator have proposed enhanced use of criminal
liability against those engaged in transgenic agriculture. M. DeGreer (Comment), Can RoundReady™ Seeds Ever Be Corralled?: Restraining Genetic Drift Through Criminal Sanctions, 29
N.E. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 255 (2003); Reece Walters, Crime, Bio-Agriculture and the
Exploitation of Hunger, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 26 (2006); Reece Walters, Criminology and
Genetically Modified Food, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 151 (2004). For a general discussion, N.
Kubasek, M. Browne, & C Williamson, The Role of Criminal Enforcement in Attaining
Environmental Compliance in the United States and Abroad, 7 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 122 (2000);
K. Gaynor & T. Bartman, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 10 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 39 (1999). See also, Mark Halsey, Against “Green” Criminology, 44 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOL. 833 (2004).
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transgenic agriculture.100 As a consequence, Denmark published a major report101 and held a
major conference,102 focusing on coexistence in Danish agriculture.103 Using the information
gathered from the DIAS Report and the 1st European Conference, the Danish government
presented legislation to the Danish Parliament relating to coexistence and liability arising from
the introduction of transgenic crops into Danish agriculture.104
Civil Liability
On 9 June, 2004, Queen Margrethe II of Denmark gave Royal Assent to Act No. 436 of
the Danish Parliament entitled Act on the Growing etc. of Genetically Modified Crops.105 With
this Royal Assent, Denmark became the first European country to enact legislation regulating the
coexistence of conventional, organic, and transgenic agriculture.106 The Act applies to the
100

Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, Strategy for co-existence – genetically
modified, conventional and organic crops (June 2003), www.agrsci.dk/gmcc-03/background.htm.
101

Danish Institute of Agricultural Sciences, Report from the Danish Working Group on
the Co-existence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic Crops (Nov.
2003) [commonly known as the DIAS Report].
102

B. Boelt (ed.), GMCC-03: GM Crops and Co-existence, Proc. 1st Euro. Conf. on the
Co-existence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic Crops (Snekkersten,
Denmark, Nov. 2003).
103

For another report on coexistence in Denmark, read J. Toft, National Report –
Denmark: Precautionary Expertise for GM Crops; Co-existence Bypassing Risk Issues, Project
No. QLRT-2001-00034 Roskilde University (June 2004) (extensively detailed, descriptive
history of the Danish reaction socially and politically to transgenic crops, with particular
emphasis on the years 1998 to 2004).
104

Ministry FAF, Strategy for co-existence, supra note 100.

105

Government of Denmark, 2004: Act on the Growing etc. of Genetically Modified
Crops, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries File No. 2004-64. [Lov om dyrkning m.v. af
genetisk modificerede afgrøder].
106

Anon, Danish law on GMOs, AGRA INFORMA (June 21, 2004).
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commercial growing, handling, sale and transport of genetically modified crops and has five
divisions: Scope and Definitions;107 Growing, Handling, Sale, Transport, etc.;108 Compensation
Scheme and Obligation to Contribute;109 Administration of the Act;110 and Provisions regarding
Penalty and Coming into Force.111
In the regulatory sections of the Act,112 the Minister of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries is
given significant discretion to promulgate administrative rules fleshing out the statutory
provisions relating to the growing, handling, sale, transportation of transgenic crops, and to the
administration of the Act. To ensure that any GM crop production is tightly regulated by the
State, the Minister may require that any Danish producer wishing to grow a GM crop must obtain
a license prior to doing so.113 The specifications of the licenses may entail that the intending
producer, at the producer’s own cost, has to participate in and pass an education course on coexistence between GM crops, conventional crops and organic crops.114 The intent of this
licensing scheme is to ensure that the Ministry has a known record of all transgenic producers

107

Act on the Growing etc., supra note 105 at §§ 1-2.

108

Id. at §§ 3-8.

109

Id. at §§ 9-12.

110

Id. at §§ 13-18;

111

Id. at §§ 19-22.

112

Id. at §§ 3-8 and 13-18. The Minister of FAF implemented the regulatory provisions
of the Act on 10 Nov 2004 with the issuance of an Executive Order on the Growing etc. of
Genetically Modified Crops.
113

Act on the Growing etc., supra note 105 at § 3(1).

114

Id. at § 3(2),(3),(4).
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within Denmark. The Danish regulatory system does not allow the unlicensed production of GM
crops.
In addition to a production license, the Minister may require any Danish producer
intending to grow a GM crop to notify the owners and users of neighbouring fields of this
intent.115 The transgenic producer also may be required to notify owners of the vehicles,
machines, equipment, and storage the transgenic producer has or will use in growing,
transporting, and storing the crop.116
As part of this notification, the Minister may require the transgenic producer to report all
fields that will contain transgenic crops so that information about the fields may be made
publically accessible.117 The Act states,
Anybody shall have access to obtain information from the
information system which either has been published or which is to
be published. This access shall comprise individual pieces of
information as well as mass information."118
The Minister may make all transgenic producer and crop location information available publicly
via the Internet.119 These provisions allow any member of the public to access the information
system and determine where the transgenic crop is growing.
Turning specifically to civil legal liability, the Act provides compensation and a funding

115

Id. at § 6(1)(ii)(a).

116

Id. at § 6(1)(ii)(b)&(c).

117

Id. at §§ 6(1)(iii) & 7(4).

118

Id. at § 7(4).

119

Id. at § 7(2).
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mechanism in sections 9 through 12. Without clearly stating the legal standard, the Act
apparently adopts a fault liability regime whereby transgenic growers will bear the statutorily
stated damages to conventional and organic producers only if they fail to comply with regulations
governing the growing of transgenic crops.
The transgenic growers bear the liability by first paying a per hectare fee into a
compensation fund. Second, a transgenic grower bears liability individually to reimburse the
compensation fund if the grower failed to comply with regulations governing the growing of
transgenic crops. The Danish liability system works as follows.
The Minister
shall pay compensation to any farmer who suffers a loss due to the
occurrence of genetically modified material in his crops if:
(i) in the same growing season within a specified area, a
genetically modified crop of the same or a related variety has been
grown which may be crossbred into the crop of the farmer
suffering the loss and
(ii) the genetically modified crop can be identified in the
crop of the farmer suffering the loss.120
In addition to the compensation for pollen flow just quoted, the Minister also shall pay
compensation “if an authorized organic farmer suffers a loss due to the occurrence of genetically
modified seed in his seed for sowing.”121
In defining the compensation to which the farmer suffering the loss is entitled, the Act
states that the amount to be paid for either pollen flow or organic seed
shall not exceed:
(i) the reduction in the sales price of the crop caused by the
120

Id. at § 9(1).

121

Id. at § 9(4).
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occurrence of genetically modified material,
(ii) the costs for sampling and analysis and
(iii) any losses as a consequence of requirements for
conversion of organic areas or animals due to the occurrence of
genetically modified material.122
While the just-quoted section 9 subsections (1), (4), and (3) appear to create a very broad
legal liability risk for the transgenic grower, the Act has several limitations which are likely to
reduce greatly that legal liability risk. These several limitations are worthy of explicit discussion.
As probably the most important compensation limitation, the Act states,
Compensation cannot be paid for any loss suffered by such farmer
as a consequence of the occurrence of genetically modified
material in the crops of the farmer suffering the loss if the
occurrence of genetically modified material does not exceed a
specific threshold value fixed by the Minister.123
In the proposed Draft Executive Order to implement the Act with regulations, the Minister has
set the specific threshold value as identical to that mandated by EU regulations for labelling of
crops or seed as genetically modified.124 The Danish Plant Directorate is tasked with sampling
and testing to determine if the presences of transgenic material in the crop or seed of a
neighbouring farmer is above the labelling threshold.125 If the neighboring farmer’s crop or seed

122

Id. at § 9(3).

123

Id. at § 9(6).

124

Draft Executive Order on Compensation for Losses due to Certain Occurrences of
Genetically Modified Material at § 2(1) (10 Nov. 2004). [hereafter Draft Executive Order on
Compensation].
The Minister likely set the threshold levels for compensation at the EU legal thresholds in
order to gain approval of the Danish compensation scheme by the EU. European Commission,
Secretariat General, State Aides – Denmark – Compensation for losses due to the presence of
certain GMO material, No. 568/2004 (23 Nov 2005) (approval of the Danish Act).
125

Draft Executive Order on Compensation at §§ 2(2), 7 & 8.
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is below the threshold, the neighbouring farmer bears the cost of sampling and testing and does
not receive compensation.126
As a second compensation limitation, the Minister is to promulgate administrative rules
delimiting the geographic area within which a farmer can be considered a neighbour for purposes
of compensation.127 In the Draft Executive Order, the Minister attached an Annex 1 with a chart
distinguishing between distances for seed and distances for crop production. The distances vary
by the crop species: for maize the distance for production is 300 meters; for sugar beet, seed
(3000 meters) and production (75 meters); for potato, seed (30 meters) and production (30
meter). The Minister set no distance for maize seed production because Denmark produces no
seed for sowing of maize. Only farmers within these distances from a transgenic field are
eligible to file claims for compensation under the Danish Act.
As a third compensation limitation, the farmer making the claim may forfeit the claim or
have the claim reduced if the claiming farmer
... has deliberately or inadvertently contributed to the occurrence of
the loss or due to his behaviour has reduced his opportunities of
making a recourse claim.128
By statutory provision, a farmer forfeits a claim if the farmer fails to file a claim “without undue
delay”129 – a requirement obviously meant to facilitate the Danish Plant Directorate in sampling
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Draft Executive Order on Compensation §§ 2(1) & 9.

127

Act on the Growing etc., supra note 105 at § 9(2).

128

Act on the Growing etc., supra note 105 at § 9(5).

129

Id. at § 10. For the procedures for filing a compensation claim and appealing a
compensation decision, Draft Executive Order on Compensation at §§ 4, 5, 6, & 13.
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and testing the level of transgenic material present in the claiming farmer’s field. Moreover, the
farmer suffering loss either files a compensation claim or pursues a private civil liability
remedy.130 After paying a compensation claim, the Minister has subrogation rights to any civil
liability remedy131 and can also recover from the claiming farmer if the claiming farmer has
obtained a double recovery (such as a settlement from the transgenic farmer or an insurance
payment).132
In an attempt to recover part of, or all, of the costs related to this compensation scheme,
the Act stipulates that all producers planting a transgenic crop are required to pay 100 Danish
kroner133 per hectare every year of transgenic crop seeded.134 This per hectare fee is in addition to
any cost that the transgenic producer would have to pay to have access to the technology from the
seed companies.
In light of the compensation scheme set forth in the Act, it is unclear how the scheme will
affect the behaviour of Danish farmers and the Danish government. Some possible behavioral
responses to this new and untested law include the following:
• While non-transgenic farmers retain the right to pursue civil legal liability
against transgenic farmers, non-transgenic farmers may well prefer to file a claim for
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Act on Growing etc., supra note 105 at § 11.

131

Draft Executive Order on Compensation at § 12.

132

Draft Executive Order on Compensation at § 11(2).
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As of September 25, 2005, Internet websites showed an exchange rate of 100 Danish
kroner equaling C$19 or US$16 per hectare. With one hectare being equivalent to 2.47 acres, the
fee is C$ 8.50 or US$ 8.00 per acre.
134

Act on Growing etc., supra note 105 at § 12.
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compensation as a quicker, easier way of recovering compensation for losses. Hence, there may
be few farmer versus farmer civil lawsuits.
• After paying compensation, the Danish government has subrogation rights
against transgenic farmers but it is unclear whether the Danish government would pursue
subrogation through civil legal liability. The transgenic farmers have already paid a per hectare
fee that funded the compensation scheme. In effect, the transgenic farmers have already paid the
Danish government. The Danish government may have little incentive, economic or political, to
engage in civil litigation against these farmers because litigation would consume time and money
of the Danish Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry.135
• In light of the per hectare fee per year that transgenic farmers must pay to grow
transgenic crops and fund the compensation scheme, it is not clear how many hectares of
approved transgenic crops Danish farmers would plant. The European Commission has
approved this compensation scheme for the limited period of five years as a way of contributing
to the successful introduction of transgenic agriculture to Denmark.136 However, the fee is
functionally a tax on producing transgenic crops. From the farmers’ perspective, the tax – 100
Danish kroner per hectare per year – may make it not worthwhile or uneconomical to plant
transgenic crops. Thus, it is unclear whether Danish farmers will actually plant transgenic crops
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Of course, the Ministry FAF may well decide to pursue administrative sanctions
against a farmer who caused a compensable loss – e.g. the revocation of the farmer’s license to
grow transgenic crops. Moreover, if the farmer who caused a compensable loss engaged in
“gross or willful violations” of the provisions of the Act, MFAF can seek to apply the applicable
sections of the Danish Criminal Code to the farmer’s conduct. Id. at § 14.
136

EU Commission, Secretariat General, State Aides – Denmark, supra note 124.
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during the next five years of the tax.137
With the Danish Act described, it is now beneficial to make a comparison with the
previous scenarios that were discussed within the Canadian and American legal contexts. Of
course, the application of the Danish Act to the five scenarios will be a discussion in the abstract
because, as no transgenic crops have been grown commercially in Denmark, no compensation
fund exists and no claims for compensation have yet been possible.
Scenario One: Claim for damages arising from an unapproved transgenic crop mixing
with commercial agricultural crops.
Section 9(6) speaks indirectly to liability for growing unapproved transgenic crops.
Section 9(6) gives compensation if the presence of the genetic material exceeds a specific
threshold set by the Minister of DFAF. In the Draft Executive Order on Compensation
implementing section 9(6) the Minister did not specifically address the threshold for unapproved
transgenic crops. However, it is easy to speculate with a high degree of confidence that the
Minister would adopt the EU threshold for unapproved transgenic crops just as the Minister
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Anon, Denmark to tax farmers of GM crops, NEW SCIENTIST (Dec. 2, 2005),
www.newscientist.com/channel/opinion/mg18825283.300. This article states, “Depending on
your point of view, it’s either a neat ruse to help keep genetically modified crops out of Europe,
or an unfair barrier to farmers who want to benefit from GM technology. ... Don’t expect the
Danish fund to be bursting with cash though: like all European countries except Spain, it has no
GM farmers yet.”
Under the 2004 amendments to its Act to Regulate Genetic Engineering, Germany too is
considering a compensation scheme that would require farmers of transgenic crops to pay a fixed
amount per hectare into a fund administered by the government. However, as of the January
2006, the German government and agricultural organizations (those representing farmers, seed
companies, and seed developers) have been unable to agree on the specific details of such fund.
This is another future development to watch as the German law evolves. Mark Hucko, GM crops
in Germany stalled, CHECKBIOTECH (Jan. 20, 2006).
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adopted the EU thresholds for seed production and crop production.138 The EU threshold for
unapproved transgenic crops is zero. Consequently, if a Danish court faced a claim for
compensation due to the presence of unapproved transgenic material, the Danish court assuredly
could and would interpret section 9(6) to allow compensation. By so doing, the Danish statutory
scheme and the Danish court would impose civil legal liability for commingling of unapproved
transgenic crops with conventional and organic crops just as happens in Canadian and American
jurisprudence.
Scenario Two: Claim for damages arising from an approved transgenic crop mixing with
non-transgenic crops resulting in a loss of a premium for a person or company who intended to
sell a non-transgenic commodity or food product.
Scenario Three: Claim for damages arising from an approved transgenic crop mixing with
organic crops resulting in a loss of the organic label for the specific organic crop or of organic
certification for the organic farmer's farm.
The Danish Act139 and the Draft Executive Order on Compensation140 specifically address
compensation for Scenarios Two and Three. If the non-transgenic farmer (conventional or
organic) has the presence of transgenic material in his seed or crop above the EU legal
thresholds, that non-transgenic farmer has a valid claim for compensation in Denmark. Because
the laws and regulations of Denmark have specific thresholds related to labeling, Danish
jurisprudence in theory will impose civil legal liability upon transgenic farmers more often than
do Canadian and American cases and statutes.
In practice, however, it is likely that Danish jurisprudence will mirror Canadian and
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For discussion of the section 9(6) thresholds for approved transgenic crops, read text
and accompanying notes 123-126 supra.
139

Act on Growing supra note 105 at § 9(1),(4),(6).

140

Draft Executive Order on Compensation §§ 1 & 2.
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American jurisprudence because the Danish Act will likely give rise infrequently to any
compensable claims above the specified thresholds within the geographical boundaries that the
Minister has established.141 By adopting neighborly coexistence practices, Danish transgenic
farmers can control the adventitious spread of their transgenic crops with fairly easy and familiar
agronomic practices. Hence, transgenic farmers must pay attention to the potential for civil legal
liability under the Danish Act and the DFAF Executive Order implementing it. But if transgenic
farmers pay attention agronomically, they run minimal risk that civil legal liability will actually
become reality.142
Making civil legal liability available in theory but rare in reality is the paradigm of
coexistence in Denmark and at the Secretariat General level of the EU.143
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Draft Executive Order on Compensation § 2 and Annex 1.

142

Danish transgenic farmers can gain a sense for the relative ease of avoiding
adventitious presence by reading DIAS Report supra note 101 at Ch. 6 Seed Production and
Threshold Values, Ch. 7 Monitoring and analytical methods, and Ch. 10 Review of crops. See
also, citations to coexistence studies in notes 176 & 181 infra.
143

The Danish and EU Secretariat General paradigm of coexistence about civil liability
explains why Friends of the Earth Europe complained about the Danish Act after its legislative
enactment. Friends of the Earth Europe [FOEE], Danish co-existence law is full of weaknesses,
BIOTECH MAILOUT 10 (July 2004).
It is interesting to note that when the Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries first
presented its proposal for coexistence, the Ministry made the following comment:
“The rules governing co-existence will be based on the legal
opinion of the Attorney to the Danish Government of 16 January
2003. Against this background, the rules governing co-existence
will not contain separate provisions on liability. The point of
departure is that the GM farmer may be held liable for any
mistakes and violations whereby the organic or GM-free farmer
has incurred a financial loss. Assessment of the question of
liability will, subsequently, be left to the courts of law in
accordance with the fundamental principles of liability in tort.”
Ministry of FAF, Strategy for co-existence, supra note 100.
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Scenario Four: Claim for damages arising from the loss of market access. For example,
where a buyer decides against buying a farmer's crop even though there was no evidence of
transgenic material or the evidence of transgenic material was below legally-set thresholds.
Scenario Five: Claim for damages arising from a decision by a farmer to forgo planting a
particular crop because of concern about proximity to transgenic crops or market perception
about transgenic crops.
Although the Danish Act was passed by a Parliament that has been described as a “GMOcautious majority,”144 neither the Act nor the Executive Orders (final and draft) of November
2004 use the word “precautionary.” By excluding this word from the statute and regulations
relating to the laws about coexistence of conventional, organic, and transgenic crops in Danish
agriculture, the Danish Parliament is signaling to the acceptance of transgenic crops within the
Danish agricultural sector.145
This acceptance is also apparent in the fact that the Danish Act does not authorize
compensation for loss of markets or farmer’s concern with consumer perceptions about
transgenic crops. The Danish Act confines the compensation scheme only to transgenic pollen
flow in seed and crop production to neighboring non-transgenic farms. Even regarding pollen
flow, the neighboring farmer only has a compensable claim when experiencing transgenic
presence above the EU legal threshold levels for labelling as genetically modified. Hence, the

The Ministry’s proposal to rely solely on the “fundamental principles of liability in tort” was
obviously rejected by the Danish Parliament, which opted for a fault liability and funded
compensation scheme.
144

The “GMO-cautious majority” terminology to describe the Danish Parliament is used
numerous times by J. Toft, National Report, supra note 103.
145

Anon, Soc Dem shift opens door on GMO, Denmark.dk The Official Window (16
Sept 2005) (“The opposition Social Democrats have announced that they plan to give up their
blanket rejection of genetically modified organisms (GMO), reported national daily Politiken on
Friday. ... With the Social Democrat’s change of course, the parliament’s long-standing majority
opposition to GMO has dried up.”)
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Danish Act does not create civil legal liability for Scenarios Four and Five.
By excluding Scenarios Four and Five from the compensation scheme, the Danish
Parliament is rejecting civil legal liability claims for pure economic loss. By so doing, Danish
jurisprudence will be substantially identical to the Canadian and American jurisprudence relating
to pure economic loss.146
Administrative Liability
The Danish Act on the Growing etc. of Genetically Modified Crops (June 2004) contains
provisions creating administrative sanctions for those who violate the Act.147 However, these
administrative sanctions are common place in statutes that create a regulatory scheme.
Therefore, the Danish Act does not create any unique or unusual administrative liability for
Danish farmers who decide to grow transgenic crops.
The Danish Act does not create either civil liability or administrative liability for
generalized environmental harms.148 If transgenic crops cause environmental damage in
Denmark, the Danish legal system will deal with these environmental harms through the ordinary
and usual environmental liability instruments – e.g. Environmental Protection Act of 1998 (as
amended) and the Act on Compensation for Environmental Damage of 1994 (as amended).149

146

For discussion of Scenarios Four and Five and the pure economic loss doctrine in
Canada and the United States, read text and accompanying notes 36 to 68 supra.
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Act on the Growing etc., supra 105 at §§ 19 & 20.

148

FOEE, Danish co-existence law, supra 143 at 12 (“Another major weakness of the
compensation scheme is that it only covers economic and not environmental damage, as may
occur as a result of the escape of GMOs to wild plants.”)
149

For fuller discussion of these ordinary and usual Danish environmental liability
instruments, P. Truelsen, Environmental Liability as an Instrument in Danish Environmental
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Danish law does not impose unique or unusual administrative liability upon transgenic
farmers and transgenic agriculture. In this regard, Danish jurisprudence is similar to the national
jurisprudence of Canada and the United States.150
Criminal Liability
The Danish Act on the Growing etc of Genetically Modified Crops (June 2004) does have
criminal penalties for both individual farmers and for corporations that violate the regulatory
scheme created in the Act.151 However, these criminal penalties relate to violating the
administrative obligations related to growing transgenic crops. Like Canada and the United
States, Denmark has not created criminal statutes that are uniquely applicable to those who
create, sell, use, or grow transgenic crops. Hence, assuming administrative compliance, a
transgenic farmer in Denmark has no need to fear criminal liability for engaging in transgenic
agriculture. The transgenic farmer is accountable to Danish criminal laws no differently than
conventional and organic farmers are accountable to Danish criminal laws.152

Law?, Workshop on Liability, Economics, and Insurance (Odense, Denmark, Oct. 1998),
www.akf.dk/som/pdf/som32.
Of course, Denmark will also have the European Union Environmental Liability Directive
as part of its law. The EU Environmental Liability Directive does not appear to have any unique
implications for transgenic agriculture in Denmark. The Directive is more fully discussed under
Legal Liability: Germany Administrative Liability infra where the Directive does have unique
implications for transgenic agriculture in Germany.
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For discussion of administrative liability in Canada and the United States, read text
and accompanying notes 69 to 97 supra.
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Act on the Growing etc., supra note 154 at §§ 14(1), 19 & 20.
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A recent commentator on the use of criminal law in Denmark for protecting the
environment has concluded that Danish criminal law “plays a minor role compared to
administrative enforcement.” P. Pagh, Administrative Criminal Law Systems in Europe: An
Asset for the Environment?, Ch. 15 at 172 in F. Comte & L. Krämer (eds), ENVIRONMENTAL
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Legal Liability: Germany
In 1993, to conform German law to European Community laws,153 Germany passed an
Act to Regulate Genetic Engineering (GenTG).154 In 2004, in response to more recent European
Union laws relating to agricultural biotechnology,155 Germany amended its GenTG by adding
new provisions regarding legal liability that are of especial relevance for this article.156

CRIME IN EUROPE (Europa Law Pub., Groningen 2004). Despite the title of Pagh’s chapter, the
substantive content of the chapter is almost entirely about Danish criminal law as an enforcement
technique for protecting the Danish environment.
153

Council Directive 90/220/EEC (23 Apr 1990) On the Deliberate Release into the
Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms.
154

Gentechnikgesetz (GenTG), Bundesgesetzblatt 1993 I, p. 2066 (published on 16 Dec
1993). The German legislature adopted amendments – that are not of significance for this article
– to the 1993 law in 1994 and 1997.
155

Directive 2001/18/EC (12 Mar 2001) On the Deliberate Release into the Environment
of Genetically Modified Organisms (repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC).
156

Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Gentechnikrechts, Bundesgesetzblatt 2005 I, p. 186
(passed by the Bundestag on 26 Nov 2004; published on 21 Dec 2004; effective on 04 Feb 2005).
The law may be found at
http://www.bmelv.de/cln_045/nn_750598/SharedDocs/Gesetzestexte/G/GesetzNeuordnungGent
echnikrechts.html
For a good summary, Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture,
Information on the Amendment to Germany’s Genetic Modification Act,
http://www.verbraucherministerium.de.
(hereafter BMVEL Information). The German initials for the Federal Ministry of Consumer
Protection, Food and Agriculture are “BMVEL.” The German legislature delegated primary
administrative responsibility for the GenTG to BMVEL.
In the fall 2005, while this article was being written, Germany held national elections. As
a result of those elections, BMVEL Minister Renate Kuenast lost her portfolio. Timm
Kragenow, The end of Kuenast’s estates, FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND (Nov. 10, 2005). In
December 2005, the new German government indicated that there would be substantial changes
in the genetic engineering law, particularly relating to the 2004 amendments. Anon, Change in
genetic engineering law, 4 (# 11-12) EURO. BIOTECH. 20 (Dec. 2005). As of the completion date
of this article, the precise substantive changes to the German GenTG are not known. However,
this article purposefully focuses on the 2004 German amendments because these amendments set
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Civil Liability
In the 1993 version of the GenTG, Part Five of the Law had five sections on “Provisions
for Liability.”157 These five 1993 sections were left unchanged by the 2004 amendments and,
therefore, are still part of the present German law on genetic engineering.
Section 32(1) Liability imposes civil liability upon operators for the death, injury,
impairment of health, or property damage of other persons resulting from the properties of a
genetically engineering organism. Section 32(2) adopts joint and several liability for several
operators if each is obliged to compensate for the same damage. Section 32(3) adds that Civil
Code section 254 applies if the party suffering the damage contributed to the occurrence of the
damage. Section 32(7) provides that liability for damage to property extends to impairment of
nature or landscape for which the party damaged expends funds in restoration of the prior natural
or landscaped state.158

forth a distinct model for legal liability that is worth analyzing thoroughly even if that model
does not survive, in light of the new (2005) German government’s policies, as the actual law in
Germany.
One change in Germany should be noted. The new Minister, Horst Seehofer, changed the
name of the ministry to Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection. The
German initials of the ministry have consequently changed to BMELV, as opposed to BMVEL
under the previous government. The authors purposefully chose to use the initials BMVEL from
the previous government in order to emphasize the 2004 law that is the comparative focus in this
article. The 2004 amendments came at the initiative of the previous government under former
Minister Renate Kuenast, a Green Party member.
157

Those five sections are as follows: § 32 Liability (Haftung); § 33 Maximum amount
of liability (Haftungshöchstbetrag); § 34 Presumption of cause (Ursachenvermutung); § 35 Right
to information of the party having suffered damage (Auskunftsansprüche des Geschädigten); § 36
Provision of sufficient cover (Deckungsvorsorge); § 37 Liability according to other legal
regulations (Haftung nach anderen Rechtsvorschriften).
158

Section 32(4),(5),(6) specify compensable costs to include medical costs incurred for
the injury, burial costs if the person is killed, and lost earning capacity to the person injured and
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Section 3(9) Definitions defines “Operator” to include those who establish a genetic
engineering installation,159 perform genetic engineering operations,160 or release161 or place on the
market genetically modified organisms without authorization under the GenTG.
When the Section 3(9) definition of “operator” is taken into account, it becomes clear that
Section 32 Liability exists only for those involved with transgenic organisms through laboratory
or confined experiments, field testing, or deliberate introduction into the environment (by release
or placing on the market) without authorization. Moreover, the damage for which compensation
exists under Section 32 is direct, physical damage to the life, health, or property (including nature
and landscape) of another person. Finally, even when an operator is found liable for the direct,
physical damage under Section 32, Section 33 Maximum amount of liability places an exposure
cap of 160 million German marks162 for this liability.
Taking into account the scope of Section 32 (liability against operators for direct, physical
damages for transgenic organisms that are experimental or have not been authorized for placing
on the market) and the maximum amount of liability of Section 33, the 1993 GenTG did not

to those dependent upon the person injured or killed.
159

Section 3(4) defines “genetic engineering installation.”

160

Section 3(2) defines “genetic engineering operations.”

161

Section 3(7) defines “release.”

162

As of September 1, 2005, Internet websites showed an exchange rate of 160 million
German marks equaling $C 120,000,000 or $US 100,800,000. The authors are aware that the
European Union euro has replaced the German mark as the German currency.
46

create significant risks of civil liability for agricultural biotechnology.163 As for transgenic crops
authorized for placing on the market for introduction into the environment, the 1993 GenTG did
not create any unique or special liability for developers of authorized transgenic seeds or for
farmers who grew them.164
By its emphasis on direct, physical injury and the absence of authorization for
commercial release of the transgenic organism, Section 32 of the 1993 GenTG creates civil
liability that is quite similar to the civil liability that United States courts recognized for Aventis
CropScience in the StarLink™ litigation.165 Indeed, taking into account the Section 33 cap on
damages for a Section 32 violation, the 1993 GenTG would have imposed lesser monetary
damages upon Aventis CropScience than Aventis actually paid in the settlements resulting from
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With respect to liability issues, the German Parliament adopted a civil liability law for
harmful environmental effects in 1990. Federal Environmental Liability Act
(Umwelhaftungsgezets), Bundesgesetzblatt 1990 I, p. 2634. Private parties who are injured in
their life, body, health, or property by certain specified activities, listed in an annex to the statute,
that have harmful effects on the environment are entitled to sue. Operators of the specified
activities are strictly liable to those parties who are injured by harmful effects on the environment
caused by the listed activities. Agricultural biotechnology is not a listed activity in the statutory
annex. Moreover, the Environmental Liability Law does not allow for liability for purely
environmental harms – i.e. harms that are not interrelated with an injury to life, body, health, or
property of private persons. J. Taupitz, The German Environmental Liability Law of 1990:
Continuing Problems and the Impact of European Regulation, 19 SYR. J. INT’L L. & COMM. 13
(1993).
When one reads the Environmental Liability Act, the striking similarity in content
between its statutory provisions and the statutory provisions of the GenTG of 1993 is clearly
obvious.
164

While Germany itself has not approved any transgenic crops for German farmers,
German farmers have had access to limited amounts of transgenic maize approved by Spain, a
fellow member of the European Union. German farmers planted about 500 hectares in 2004.
USDA-FAS GAIN Report #GM4014, German Farmers’ Interest in Planting Bt-Corn 2004
(March 25, 2004).
165

The StarLink™ litigation is discussed in the text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
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the StarLink™ litigation in the United States under Common Law tort claims.166
In 2004, the German legislature added a new section, section 36a,167 to the Part V
Provisions on Liability of the GenTG. To understand section 36a and its ramifications, it is
worthwhile to quote section 36a(1), which sets forth the statutory language about civil liability, in
full.
Section 36a Claims in Case of Impairment of Usage
(1) The transfer of characteristics of an organism that are based on
genetic engineering work or other introductions of GMOs represent
a significant impairment within the meaning of Section 906 of the
German Civil Code if, contrary to what the party entitled to use
[non-transgenic organisms] intended, and due to the transfer or
other introduction, products may, in particular,
1. not be placed on the market or
2. according to the stipulations of the present Act or
according to other regulations [the non-transgenic products may]
only be placed on the market with a label indicating the genetic
modification or
3. not be placed on the market with such label that would
have been possible to be used according to the respective
guidelines legally applicable for the production method.168

166

As indicated in note 24 supra, Aventis CropScience paid $US 110 million as
settlement in the United States. Using the exchange rates set forth in note 162 supra, the
maximum liability that Aventis CropScience could have faced under the 1993 GenTG § 33 was
$US 100,800,000.
167

Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Gentechnikrechts, Bundesgesetzblatt 2005 I, p. 186 §36a
Claims in the Case of Impairment of Usage (Ansprüche bei Nutzungsbeeinträchtigungen).
168

Translation from Hollander van der Mey/MS&L Public Relations/Public Affairs
Netherlands, Amendments to the German Law of Genetic Engineering (November 2004). The
German text is as follows:
Section 36a Ansprüche bei Nutzungsbeeinträchtigungen
(1) Die Übertragung von Eigenschaftern eines Organismus, die auf gentechnischen
Arbeiten beruhen, oder sonstige Einträge von gentechnisch veränderten Organismen stellen eine
wesentliche Beeinträchtigung im Sinne von § 906 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches dar, wenn
entgegen der Absicht des Nutzungsberechtigten wegen der Übertragung oder des sonstigen
Eintrags Erzeugnisse insbesondere
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Section 36a(1) provides that civil liability attaches to any person growing transgenic
crops when the “characteristics” of the transgenic crop transfer to other farm products or when
the “other introduction” of transgenic crops impacts other farm products, which acts of transfer
or other introduction are statutorily determined to “represent a significant impairment within the
meaning of Section 906 of the German Civil Code.”169 Section 36a(1) further provides that the
“significant impairment” exists “in particular” in three instances:
• when another farm product cannot be placed on the market;170
• when another farm product can only be placed on the market with a label
indicating that it is genetically modified;171 and
• when another farm product cannot be placed on the market with a label legally
applicable to the production method used to produce that farm product.172
Several procedural rules from the GenTG strengthen the civil liability standard of section
36a(1). First, section 34, originating in the 1993 law, provides that if damage has resulted from a
transgenic organism, the damages are presumed to come from the transgenic properties of the

1. nicht in Verkehr gebracht werden dürfen oder
2. nach den Vorschriften dieses Gesetzes oder nach anderen Vorschriften nur
unter Hinweis auf die gentechnische Veränderung gekennzeichnet in den Verkehr gebracht
werden dürfen oder
3. nicht mit einer Kennzeichnung in den Verkehr gebracht werden dürfen, die
nach den für die Produktionsweise jeweils geltenden Rechtsvorschriften möglich gewesen wäre.
169

BMVEL translates this phrase as “represent a material negative effect within the
meaning of Section 906 of the German Civil Code.” BMVEL Information supra at note 156.
170

Section 36a(1).1

171

Section 36a(1).2.

172

Section 36a(1).3
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crop unless it is probable that the damages came from non-transgenic properties of the plant.
Second, section 36a(4) establishes joint and several liability for those neighbors of the person
claiming damages. If several neighbors could be considered the cause of the significant
impairment and if the person claiming damages from the transfer or other introduction of
transgenic characteristics finds it not possible to establish which of the neighbors caused the
impairment, then all neighbors growing transgenic crops bear the section 36a(1) liability. The
several neighbors can avoid joint and several liability when one or all can establish who caused
what portion of the significant impairment so that the court can properly allocate damages to
individual neighbors. Third, section 33, the 1993 section setting a cap of damages, does not
apply to liability under section 36a because by its statutory language the section 33 cap applies
only to section 32 liability. The consequences of these three procedural statutes is that a person
can plead minimal facts supporting the damage claim under section 36a(1) liability against
several neighboring farmers growing transgenic crops and win the lawsuit based on the
presumptions created by sections 34 and 36a(4) for uncapped damages.173
The contrast between the civil liability under Section 32 of the 1993 law and Section 36a
of the 2004 law is exceedingly important. Section 36a creates liability for any person who grows
transgenic crops. Obviously, section 36a applies to operators – those liable under Section 32 –
but also transgenic farmers. Section 36a purposefully focuses on transgenic farmers as being
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Section 35, originating in the 1993 law, also creates a procedural advantage for those
claiming damages but this procedural advantage, by explicit statutory language, only applies to a
claim under section 32 liability.
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subject to civil liability and explicitly allows farmer versus farmer lawsuits.174 In addition,
Section 36a creates liability for authorized transgenic crops (i.e. those transgenic crops fully
approved for placing on the market) whereas Section 32 liability only applies to those transgenic
organisms that are not authorized for placing on the market. Section 36a(2) highlights liability for
authorized transgenic crops by imposing the obligation of compliance with good agricultural
practices, as specified in section 16b175 and implemented by BMVEL regulations.176 However,
compliance with good farming practices is not a defense to imposition of civil liability under
Section 36a(1).177
Section 36a(1) civil liability can be best understood by applying it to the five factual
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BMVEL Information supra note 156 at “II.3. Defensive and compensatory claims
under civil law, Section 36a.” See also, Friends of the Earth Europe [FOEE], German law on coexistence – improved, BIOTECH MAILOUT 6, 8 (July 2004).
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Section 16b Handling of product placed on the market (Umgang mit in Verkehr
gebrachten Produkten). Section 16b was added to the GenTG by the 2004 amendments. Section
16b also incorporates the precautionary principle from § 1 Purpose of the Act (Zweck des
Gesetzes). The explicit reference to the precautionary principle was added to § 1 by the 2004
amendments. BMVEL Information supra note 156 at “II.1. Obligation to take precautionary
action and comply with “good farming practice”, Section 16b” and “III.1, Precautionary
Principle, Section 1”.
176

For example, BMVEL has proposed that good farming practices should require a
1,000 meter buffer zone between transgenic maize crops and surrounding crops. USDA-FAS
GAIN Report #GM4051, German Genetech Law and GMO Test Plantings in 2004 (Dec. 2,
2004). By contrast, a scientific study by Martin Luther University (Germany) concluded that a
20 meter buffer zone would protect surrounding non-transgenic crops from adventitious presence
in excess of the 0.9% level that triggers labeling as genetically modified under EU regulations.
W. Weber & T. Bringezu, supra note 25. The difference between the BMVEL 1000 meter
separation distance and the University 20 meter separation distance is an obvious application of
the precautionary principle from § 1 of the Act into the good farm practices regulations of § 16b
of the Act.
177

BMVEL Information supra note 156 at “II.3 Defensive and compensatory claims
under civil law, Section 36a..”
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scenarios previously discussed under Canadian and American law.
Scenario One: Claim for damages arising from an unapproved transgenic crop mixing
with commercial agricultural crops.
Section 36a(1).1 explicitly imposes civil liability when transgenic traits that are not fully
authorized for placing on the market commingle with a neighbor’s commercial crops. Under
section 36a, the presence of any unauthorized-for-full-commercial-release transgenic traits in a
commercial crop results in civil liability for economic damage because the commercial crop must
be withheld or recalled from the market.
Section 36a(1).1 clearly creates civil liability in the same circumstances as existed in the
United States in the StarLink™ litigation.178 However, section 36a(1).1 also emphasizes broader
civil liability beyond the StarLink™ litigation because the commentary on section 36a(1).1
focuses on authorized field trials as the most likely fact pattern to which section 36a(1).1
applies.179 The StarLink™ litigation did not involve field trials. StarLink™ involved the
intermingling of a transgenic crop approved for commercial release only for animal feed that
became intermingled with the food supply. The StarLink™ litigation issued no ruling about civil
liability, if any, arising from properly authorized and properly conducted field trials.180 By
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The StarLink™ litigation is discussed in the text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.

179

BMVEL Information supra note 156 (specific discussion of liability for field trials) at
II. Provisions to ensure the protection of GM-free farming (coexistence provisions).
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In the United States, the Prodigene incident may be most similar to the field trial
focus of section 36a(1).1. Prodigene is a biopharmaceutical company that conducted field trials
of corn genetically modified to produce a swine vaccine. Prodigene failed to comply with permit
protocols and its transgenic corn became commingled with 500,000 bushels of commercial
soybeans. As a consequence, Prodigene paid an administrative fine of $US 250,000 and spent
approximately $US 3 million for disposal and cleanup costs. Aziz Elbehri, Biopharming and the
Food System: Examining the Potential Benefits and Risks, 8(1) AGBIOFORUM 18, 23 (2005).
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contrast, section 36a(1).1 imposes civil liability on any commingling from a field trial with a
commercial agricultural crop even when the operator conducting the field trial has fully complied
with required field trial protocols.
Scenario Two. Claim for damages arising from an approved transgenic crop mixing with
non-transgenic crops resulting in a loss of a premium for a person or company who intended to
sell a non-transgenic commodity or food product.
Section 36a(1).2 explicitly imposes civil liability when “according to the stipulations of
the present Act or according to other regulations, [the non-transgenic farmer’s products may]
only be placed on the market with a label indicating the genetic modification.”
In light of the statutory language of section 36a(1).2, German law clearly establishes civil
liability for the economic loss of a premium when the person who lost the premium intended to
produce a non-transgenic crop. Consequently, if a non-transgenic farmer produced a crop that
had to be labeled under EU law, because it had above 0.9% adventitious presence of transgenic
content, the non-transgenic farmer has a civil liability claim against neighboring transgenic
farmers.
If section 36a(1).2 only applies to premiums lost when a non-transgenic farmer is
required to label a product as “genetically modified” in accordance with EU legislation, the
German civil liability law would likely produce very few, if any, law suits. In light of studies
conducted in the European Union about coexistence, the risk of liability for adventitious presence
above the 0.9% level is very small so long as farmers follow reasonable agronomic practices.181

The Prodigene incident involved a violation of administrative permit conditions for conducting
the field trial.
181

G. Brookes & P. Barfoot, Co-existence of GM and non GM arable crops: the non GM
and organic context in the EU (May 2004). Brookes and Barfoot write, “The evidence to date
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If section 36a(1).2 only applies to labeling above the EU 0.9% limit for adventitious presences,
German jurisprudence would mirror Canadian and American jurisprudence about civil liability
for Scenario Two.182
However, section 36a(1).2 reads to apply to situations other than premiums lost because
of EU labeling requirements. Section 36a(1).2 also applies when “according to other
regulations” the product may only be placed on the market “with a label indicating the genetic
modification.” While section 36a(1).2 is not clear, one environmental organization reads its
language to also apply to factual situations in which a conventional farmer has contractually
agreed to produce a crop with adventitious presence below the EU 0.9% labeling standard.183 If
the farmer fails to meet the contractually agreed standard and, therefore, must apply a label as
“genetically modified,” this environmental organization argues that the farmer has suffered an
economic loss for which section 36a(1).2 provides civil liability against neighboring transgenic

shows that GM crops growing commercially in the EU and in North America have co-existed
with conventional and organic crops without economic and commercial problems – only isolated
instances have been reported of adventitious presence of GMOs occurring in organic crops, even
in North America where GM crops dominate production of soybeans, maize and canola.” Id. at
3. See also, W. Weber & T. Bringezu, supra note 25 (20 meter separation distance) and
European Commission Joint Research Centre Institute for Prospective Technological Studies,
Scenarios for co-existence of genetically modified, conventional and organic crops in European
agriculture (2002).
182

For the discussion of Scenario Two under Canadian and American law, read text and
accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
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For example, a conventional farmer signs a contract to produce a conventional crop
with no transgenic presence; the farmer also agrees that the crop can be labeled as “genetically
modified” if it tests for any transgenic presence. The farmer delivers the crop to the contract
buyer who tests it and finds 0.1% transgenic material. The contract buyer says the crop with the
0.1% transgenic content, under the contract, must be labeled as “genetically modified.”
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farmers.184 If section 36a(1).2 imposes civil liability for voluntarily assumed contractual
obligations, German civil liability would be much broader for authorized transgenic crops than is
true for authorized transgenic crops in Canada and the United States.
Scenario Three. Claim for damages arising from an approved transgenic crop mixing
with organic crops resulting in a loss of the organic label for the specific organic crop or of
organic certification for the organic farmer’s farm.185
Section 36a(1).3 explicitly imposes civil liability upon transgenic farmers if an organic
farmer cannot place a crop on the market with an organic label “that would have been possible to
be used according to the respective guidelines legally applicable for the production method.”
If the section 36a(1).3 language – “the respective guidelines legally applicable” –
referred solely to EU regulations about organic production, German transgenic farmers should
have little concern about civil liability. EU organic regulations prohibit the use of transgenic
seeds or transgenic materials because the regulations focus on production standards.186 However,
the EU organic regulations set no specific de minimis level for adventitious presence of
transgenic material. Although not without dispute about the correct legal interpretation of the
organic regulations, the EU Commission has advised that organic farmers do not lose the organic
label for products unless the farmer intentionally uses transgenic seeds or materials or unless the
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FOEE, German law, supra note 174.
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M. Migus, supra note 28.
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Council Regulation (EC) No 1804/1999 of 19 July 1999 supplemented by Regulation
(EEC) No 2092/91 on organic production of agricultural products. See especially, Art. 4
Definitions (14) “use of GMOs and GMO derivatives” and Art. 5 Labelling passim “the product
has been produced without the use of genetically modified organisms and/or any products
derived from such organisms.”
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product is above the 0.9% labeling requirement generally applicable to agricultural products.187
The EU Commission has given this interpretation because, in the absence of a specific threshold
for transgenic content being set forth in the organic regulations, the general thresholds apply.188
Hence, the EU organic regulations, like Canadian and American organic regulations, would not
impose civil liability on transgenic farmers for solely adventitious presence (i.e. less than 0.9% in
the EU) of transgenic material commingled with an organic crop.189
However, the statutory language of section 36a(1).3 – “the respective guidelines legally
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This advice from the EU Commission is clearly seen in the coexistence documents
prepared by the governments of the UK and Ireland. UK REPORT: GM Crops?, supra note 35 at
113 (Nov. 2003); Report of the Working Group (Ireland) supra note 26 at 96 (6.1.1 EU
Regulations pertaining to GMOs and organic production). But see, A. Bock et al, Scenarios for
co-existence of genetically modified, conventional and organic crops in European agriculture,
EU/Joint Research Center/Inst. for Prospective. Tech. Studies (May 2002) (Bock et al simply
assert, “The possibility of changing practices to meet very low thresholds for all crops, near the
analytical limit of quantification (~0.1%) is also considered in the report. This reflects the
situation in organic farming where the use of GM varieties is not permitted (Council Regulation
(EC) 1804/1999), setting a de facto threshold.”)
188

Although not a binding regulation, the EU Commission in its Guidelines for the
Development of National Strategies and Best Practices to Ensure the Coexistence of Genetically
Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic Farming (2003/556/EC) wrote,
“2.2.3 Labelling threshold values.
“National strategies and best practices for coexistence should refer to the legal labelling
thresholds and applicable purity standards for GM food, feed and seed.
“ ... These labelling thresholds would apply to conventional and organic farming alike.
No legal thresholds exist for the adventitious presence of non-GMOs in GMOs. For seed of GM
varieties, the general crop-specific requirements for purity standards in seed production apply.
“The organic farming regulation [1804/1999] establishes that no GMOs shall be used in
production. Thus, materials, including seeds, which are labelled as containing GMOs cannot be
used. However, seed lots containing GM seeds below the seed thresholds (which would not need
to be labelled for this GMO presence) could be used. The organic farming regulation does allow
for the setting of a specific threshold for unavoidable presence of GMOs, but no threshold has
been set. In the absence of such a specific threshold, the general thresholds apply.”
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For discussion of Scenario Three in Canadian and American law, read text and
accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
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applicable” – is a clear reference to 1998 German legislation which authorizes (but does not
require) organic producers voluntarily to label their products as “without genetic engineering.”190
While the 1998 German law does not establish a de minimis standard, German organic trade
organizations have selected 0.1% as the maximum amount of transgenic material allowed before
a German organic farmer loses the voluntary “without genetic engineering” label.191
Consequently, section 36a(1).3 also imposes civil liability upon transgenic farmers for standards
and labels voluntarily adopted by organic organizations in Germany. Under section 36a(1).3,
transgenic farmers in Germany have acquired the legal obligation to insure that organic farmers
meet organic standards and labels that the organic farmers voluntarily created for their own
marketing niche. As a result, the German 2004 law imposes civil liability upon transgenic
agriculture under Scenario Three that is much broader than Canadian and American law allows.
The EU Commission challenged the legality of § 36a(1).3 for imposing civil legal
liability upon transgenic farmers as applied to the “without genetic engineering” label. The EU
argued that Germany was attempting to establish quantitative thresholds for adventitious
presence that contradicted the legal thresholds set forth in EU regulations.192 In a reply the
German government argued that § 36a did not contradict the quantitative thresholds of EU
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BMVEL Information, supra note 156 at II. Provisions to ensure the protection of
GM-free farming (coexistence provisions). For brief discussion of the 1998 German law,
USDA-FAS GAIN Report #GM5027, Germany Biotechnology Annual 2005 at 6 & 7 (July 15,
2005).
191

Institute of Science in Society, Europe Holding Firm Against GMOs p. 2 of 4 (Nov. 1,
2005) available at www.i-sis.org.uk/EHFAG.php.
192

Letter (Notification 2004/133/D) from Olli Rehn, Commission Member to His
Excellency Mr. Joschka Fischer in 1.C Special Remarks on Article 1 Number 34 – (new § 36a
concerning liability).
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regulations but rather implemented the 1998 German law that gave the possibility for a label –
“without genetic engineering”– that is fundamentally different from the EU label – “genetically
modified”– to which, and only to which, the EU legal thresholds were legally relevant.193 There
has been no resolution of this disagreement between the EU Commission and the German
government about the legality of section 36a(1).3.
Scenario Four. Claim for damages arising from the loss of market access. For example,
where a buyer decides against buying a farmer’s crop even though there was no evidence of
transgenic material or the evidence of transgenic material was below legally-set thresholds.
Scenario Five. Claim for damages arising from a decision by a farmer to forgo planting a
particular crop because of concern about proximity to transgenic crops or market perception
about transgenic crops.194
The key to understanding how section 36a(1) applies to Scenarios Four and Five are the
two statutory words “in particular.” These two words mean that the three listed obligations of
civil liability – section 36a(1).1 through .3 discussed respectively under Scenarios One, Two and
Three – are examples of liability but do not exhaust the factual situations in which section 36a
imposes civil liability. Hence, if non-transgenic farmers (conventional or organic) were to suffer
economic losses because of the factual situations of Scenarios Four and Five, these nontransgenic farmers have a claim for liability against neighboring transgenic farmers. As
Professor Matthias Herdegen, Director of the Institute for Public Law and Institute for
International Law at the University of Bonn, has written:
“The purpose of this addition [of the words “in particular”] was to
extend the conditions triggering liability to other types of
193

Response 2004/133/D from the Federal Republic of Germany to the EU Commission
on Article 1 Number 34 (§36a). The authors have the Letter (cited in note 192 supra) and the
Response (cited in this footnote) in German in their files.
194

UK REPORT: GM Crops?, supra note 35 at p. 4 suggesting Scenarios Four and Five.
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interference which qualify as essential from the rightful user’s
[non-transgenic farmer’s] perspective. This modification of the
initial wording injects a high does of legal uncertainty into the
liability regime. In consequence, liability risks appear incalculable
and unpredictable.”195
In light of the words “in particular” in section 36a, it is highly likely that German courts
would imposed civil liability upon transgenic farmers in factual situations of Scenarios Four and
Five. Indeed, Professor Herdegen raised the question of whether section 36a would even impose
civil liability upon transgenic farmers when non-transgenic farmers claim damages for significant
impairment of their ethical values.196 Professor Herdegen apparently was referring to the fact that
the 2004 amendments to the GenTG added the words “giving due regard to ethical values” to
section 1 Purposes of the Act, giving rise to the possibility that ethical values are among the
claims in case of impairment of usage for which section 36a establishes civil liability.197
By imposing civil liability in Scenarios Four and Five, German jurisprudence is much
broader than Canadian and American civil liability. More importantly, in light of the broad
imposition of civil liability under section 36a(1), the German GenTG has specifically rejected an
important limitation on the reach of civil liability under Canadian and American law – i.e. the
pure economic loss doctrine. Scenarios Four and Five do not involve any allegation of physical
harm or inability to market a particular crop; rather Scenarios Four and Five involve solely
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M. Herdegen, The Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with Other Forms of
Farming: The Regulation by EU Members States in Light of EC Law, 2 J. INT’L. BIOTECH. L. 89,
96 (2005).
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Id. at 94.
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Greenpeace, Germany decides on new GE law, Press Release (Nov. 2004) which
states, “Ethical values and the precautionary principle have in [§ 1] paragraph 1 been included as
criteria for the first time.” Id. at additional note to § 1 at 5.
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market and consumer perceptions. Therefore, it is no surprise that Professor Herdegen describes
the civil liability under section 36a as “incalculable and unpredictable.” The fact that the civil
liability for pure economic loss is often “incalculable and unpredictable” substantially explains
why Canadian and American courts have used the pure economic loss doctrine to exclude
liability for Scenarios Four and Five.198
Under the 1993 GenTG, Section 32 only created civil liability for invasions of the life,
health, or property of the injured person, but there was no liability for pure economic loss.199
Moreover, as a general rule, German law does not widely recognize recovery for pure economic
loss. As one German commentator wrote,
The fact the primary pure economic losses are compensable only
subject to particular preconditions is probably due to the fact that
one has to put up with the general risks of life. Our law is based on
the principle that the person entitled to a legal interest is the person
to sue for damage to it. If the interest in question is the most
general of all, namely economic well-being, some special reason is
required for transferring the loss to someone else. ... But primary
economic loss calls for a special relationship of the party causing
the harm to the “economic” interest infringed. This is met in cases
of contract and some special torts. In other cases, however,
negative economic effects are part of the risk of life which the
person has to bear.200
In light of the general rule that German law does not widely recognize recovery for pure
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For discussion of Scenarios Four and Five and the pure economic loss doctrine in
Canada and the United States, read text and accompanying notes 36 to 68 supra.
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E. Deutsch, Compensation for Pure Economic Loss in German Law, Ch. 3 at 85 in E.
BANAKAS supra note 36 (“There are several different bases for product liability in Germany.
Objective, perhaps even strict, liability is imposed by ... § 31 ff of the Law on Genetic
Engineering. A common feature is that only damage to person or property is covered, so there is
no liability under these statutes for pure economic loss.”)
200

E. Deutsch supra note 199 at 87.
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economic loss, the significance of section 36a becomes even clearer. Section 36a specifically
created claims in cases of impairment of usage – protections for impairments arising from
consumer perception, market perception, and ethical values – so as to give a statutory basis in
German law for a greatly expanded recovery for pure economic loss. Section 36a singled out
transgenic agriculture to create “special torts” for which transgenic operators and farmers would
be liable and for which pure economic loss would be recoverable. By singling out transgenic
agriculture for special torts, German law presents a stark contrast with Canadian, American, and
Danish jurisprudence about civil liability for transgenic crops.
What have been the reactions to the broad civil liability for agricultural biotechnology
under section 36a of the German GenTG? The German Research Foundation predicted that
German universities and research organizations will greatly reduce their transgenic crop research,
particularly field trials, because these entities cannot bear the risks of civil liability flowing from
section 36a.201 German organizations representing farmers advised their members not to plant
transgenic crops because the liability risks are too severe.202 The German state of Saxony-Anhalt
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E.g. I. Klöpfer, Off to Canada, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (June 14, 2005); Anon.,
German Scientists Predict Death on GM Industry, AGRA EUROPE (17 Sep 2004); N. Stafford,
Law ‘may stifle German science,” THE SCIENTIST (June 28, 2004) available at www.thescientist.com/news/20040628/02; German Research Foundation, Press Release No. 29 Gone with
the Wind? The Amendment to the Law on “Green Genetic Engineering” Inhibits Innovation and
Research in Germany (9 June 2004).
In addition to the impact of section 36 upon the liability risk of research, the German
government that supported that 2004 amendments also generally withdrew support and financing
for agricultural biotechnology science projects. E.g., S. Hoffman, Seven years lost for genetic
engineering, HANDELSBLATT (Sept. 14, 2005); USDA-FAS GAIN Report #GM5011, GMO
Situation in Germany – 2005 at 4 (Feb. 24, 2005). N. Stafford, In the wake of a law seen as a
major blow for science, a major project’s funding dries up, THE SCIENTIST (Jan. 13, 2005).
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E.g. N. Stafford, GM law “a blow to science,” THE SCIENTIST (Dec. 1, 2004); Anon.,
German liability law impedes GM, AGRA INFORMA (JULY 8, 2004); Anon., New German genetic
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sued the German government challenging the GenTG 2004 amendments as violating German
constitutional provisions on occupational freedom, property rights, and the principle of
equality.203 The European Commission (EC) told the German government that the 2004
amendments to the GenTG conflict with EU regulations governing agricultural biotechnology.204
Specifically, the EC claimed that the 2004 amendments cannot impose liability for adventitious
presence below the EU standard of 0.9%, cannot hold neighboring farmers legally responsible for
damages unless the individual farmer caused the damage, and cannot impose legal obligations
that make it impractical or impossible for farmers to choose to plant approved transgenic

engineering law and reactions, Bio-Markt.info (July 2, 2004).
Despite the advice not to plant transgenic crops, German farmers have begun to plant
transgenic crops. Fifty-eight farmers planted 342 ha in 2005 of Bt maize and one hundred fortyfive registered to plant approximately 1900 ha. in 2006. For data, see the website for the German
cultivation register, http://194.95.226.237/stareg_web/showflaechen.do. For a report about the
German cultivation register, A. Gathmann & D. Bartsch, Public GMO location registers for
supporting national coexistence measures in PROC. OF THE 2nd INT’L CONF. ON CO-EXISTENCE
BETWEEN GM AND NON-GM BASED SUPPLY CHAINS (Montpellier, Nov. 2005). See also, David
Evans, Are Europe’s farmers warming to GMO maize? REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2005).
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E.g. Saxony-Anhalt: Constitutional review of the GenTG: Essential constitutional
arguments (April 2005) (document in possession of author); C. Sargent, German state to sue
Federal Government over GM laws, BLOOMBERG (April 11, 2005). See also, Anon, BadenWürttenberg Underlines its Opposition to the German Genetech Law, BIOTECH/LIFESCIENCES
PORTAL BADEN-WÜRTTENBERG (March 17, 2005) available at www.biopro.de/en/life/meldungen/01206; Joint declaration of the representatives of the BioRegions on
the amendment of the Genetic Engineering Law (GenGT) and the use of plant biotechnology in
Germany, BIOTECH/LIFESCIENCES PORTAL BADEN-WÜRTTENBERG (Nov. 2004) available at
www.bio-pro.de/en/life/meldungen/00790.
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Letter (Notification 2004/133/D) from Olli Rehn, Commission Member supra note
192. See also, Anon, European Commission Unhappy with German Biotech Bill, FOOD
CHEMICAL NEWS (Aug. 23, 2004); USDA-FAS GAIN Report #GM4029, European Commission
not Happy with Germany Genetech Law (Aug. 9, 2004)..
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crops.205 Supporters and opponents of the GenTG amendments are in agreement that these
amendments create a de facto ban on agricultural biotechnology in Germany.206 Similarly, the
EU Commission ended its review of section 36 by informing the German government,
The proposed liability regulations are generally not allowed to lead
to a high and unpredictable economic risk for GMO-farmers. The
Commission would therefore approve this bill only on the
condition that these regulations will not in actuality inhibit within
Germany the cultivation of genetically modified organisms.207
Administrative Liability
The European Union and the German Federal Republic have adopted a specialized
regulatory system that focuses on agricultural biotechnology and the process by which
agricultural biotechnology is created.208 However, the European and German regulatory laws
referred to in the preceding sentence do not address liability issues related to agricultural
biotechnology. This European and German regulatory approach to agricultural biotechnology –
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For a thorough discussion of the asserted conflicts between the EU regulations and the
GenTG 2004 amendments, M. Herdegen, supra note 195.
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E.g. K. Merkner, New law on gene crops a “de-facto ban,” FRANKFRUTER
ALLGEMEINE (Dec. 3, 2004); FOEE, German law, supra note 174 at 9.
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Letter (Notification 2004/133/D) from Olli Rehn, Commission Member supra note

138.
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The EU legislation is as follows: Directive 2001/18/EC of 12 March 2001 on the
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms; Regulation (EC) No.
1829/2003 of 22 Sept. 2003 on genetically modified food and feed; Regulation (EC) No.
1830/2003 of 22 Sept. 2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified
organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified
organisms. The German GenTG transposes the EU legislation into domestic law. The German
transposition of these EU laws is not yet complete and it is expected that additional amendments
to the GenTG will be presented to the German parliament in 2006 to finish the task of full
transposition.
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the specialized, process-oriented system – contrasts starkly with the Canadian and American
regulatory systems which do not use a specialized administrative system and which focus on the
products, not the process, of agricultural biotechnology.209
With respect to liability for environmental harms, the European Union has adopted an
Environmental Liability Directive210 that creates administrative (public law) liability for harms
related to natural resources211 and to biodiversity.212 Operators of certain occupational activities,
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For a comparison of the European regulatory system with the Canadian and American
regulatory systems, read D. Uchtmann & W. Nelson, U.S. Regulatory Oversight of Agricultural
and Food-related Biotechnology, 44 AMER. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 350 (2000) and M.
Grossman & B. Endres, Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union,
44 AMER. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 378 (2000).
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Directive 2004/35/CE of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the
prevention and remedying of environmental damage. EU members have until 30 April 2007 to
transpose this directive into domestic law. Id. Art. 19.1.
Article 2.2 of the Directive defines damage to mean “a measurable adverse change in
natural resource or measurable impairment of a natural resource service which may occur directly
or indirectly.”
For general discussion of the Directive on environmental liability, L. Krämer, Directive
2004/35/EC on Environmental Liability, 16 ENVT’L L. & MNGT. 5 (2003); V. Fogleman, The
Environmental Liability Directive, 12 ENVT’L. LIAB. 101 (2004); C. Clarke, The Proposed EC
Liability Directive: Half-way through Co-decision, 12 REV. EURO. COMM. & INT’L ENVT’L L.
254 (2003).
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The natural resources protected are water and land. Water is protected from “any
damage that significantly adversely affects the ecological, chemical and/or quantitative status
and/or ecological potential.” Id. Art. 2.1(b). Land is protected from “contamination that creates
a significant risk of human health being adversely affected as a result of the direct or indirect
introduction, in, on or under land, of substances, preparations, organisms or micro-organisms.”
Id. Art. 2.1(c).
212

Biodiversity refers to protected species and natural habitats that are protected from
“significant adverse effects on reaching or maintaining the favourable conservation status of such
habitats or species.” Id. Art. 2.1(a). Art. 2.3 further defines “protected species and natural
habitats” as limited to those species listed in Directive 79/409/EEC Art. 4(2) & Annex I or
Directive 92/43/EEC Annex II & IV; as those habitats listed in Directive 79/409/EEC Art. 4(2) &
Annex I, Directive 92/43/EEC Annex I , II, & IV; or those species or habitats not listed in
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specially listed in Annex III of the directive, have strict liability for environmental damage.213
Among the listed occupational activities are contained use of genetically modified microorganisms214 and any deliberate release into the environment or placing on the market of
genetically modified organisms.215 Operators who are liable for environmental harms from
transgenic occupational activities include transgenic farmers, research institutes and transgenic
seed developers if they have “decisive economic power over the technical functioning of” the
occupational activity that caused the environmental damage.216 Competent authorities217 are
entitled to pursue environmental liability focused on preventive actions,218 remedial actions,219
and the imposition of costs for taking preventive and remedial action upon the responsible
operator.220
Private causes of action (civil liability) for environmental damages are not authorized by

Directive 79/409/EEC and Directive 92/43/EEC that Member states designate for equivalent
purposes as those set forth in those two Directives.
213

Id. Art. 1 and Art. 3.1(a).
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Id. Annex III ¶ 10.
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Id. Annex III ¶ 11.
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Id. Art. 2.6. Transgenic seed developers will be liable only if their liability is
“provided in national legislation.” Greenpeace complained that the 2004 amendments to the
GenTG did not take advantage of this opportunity in the EU Environmental Liability Directive.
As Greenpeace reads the German 2004 GenTG, transgenic seed developers, in contrast to
farmers, are not liable for environmental damage. Greenpeace Press Release supra note 197 at 2.
217

Id. Art. 11.
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Id. Art. 5.
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Id. Art. 6.
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Id. Art. 8.
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the Directive on Environmental Liability.221 However, the Directive does empower private
citizens, including non-governmental organizations, to present information about environmental
harms to the competent authorities and request that the authorities take appropriate action.222
Competent authorities must promptly inform the person or entity making the request of its
decision about appropriate action.223 If the person or entity making the request is dissatisfied
with the decision, the person or entity is entitled to an independent and impartial review of the
decision.224 An independent review means a review independent of the competent authority and,
therefore, strongly implies a judicial review.225
Article 4 of the Directive sets forth seven exceptions to the scope of liability of which
three likely have relevant implications for agricultural biotechnology.
• Article 4.1(a) creates an exception to liability for “an act of armed conflict,
hostilities, civil war or insurrection.” Article 8.3(a) reinforces the Article 4.1(a) exception by
relieving operators of liability for environmental damage “caused by a third party ... despite the
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Id. Art. 3.3. Article 3.3 is “without prejudice to relevant national legislation” that
allows private causes of action. The German GenTG section 32 gives a private cause of action to
a person whose life, body, health has been impaired because of genetically modified organisms
and section 36a gives a private cause of action to persons whose interests are significantly
impaired by genetically modified organisms. Read the discussion of sections 32 and 36a supra
Legal Liability: Germany Civil Liability.
222

Directive 2004/35/CE at Art. 12.1. Article 12.1 also sets forth who qualifies (or who
has standing) to make the request of competent authorities.
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Id. Art. 12.4.
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Id. Art. 13.1.

225

Id. Art. 13.2. Member States may make the independent, impartial review contingent
upon the exhaustion of administrative review procedures.
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fact that appropriate safety measures were in place.”226 Third party vandalism of transgenic field
trials or transgenic fields that causes environmental harm may come within these two clauses.227
• Article 4.1(b) creates an exception to liability for “a natural phenomenon of
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character.” The parameters of this exception are unclear
and will likely remain so until such time as a terrible flood, snow storm, heat wave, or wild fire
occurs. Even more pertinently, one could ask whether cross-pollination is a “natural
phenomenon of exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character” and, therefore, whether crosspollination is within the exception to liability.
• Article 4.5 states that the Directive only applies to environmental damage
“caused by pollution of a diffuse character where it is possible to establish a causal link between
the damage and the activities of individual operators.” By reading Article 4.5, one can instantly
sense the potential conflict between this requirement of a causal connection to an individual
operator and GenTG section 36a.4 imposing joint and several liability on transgenic farmers and
GenTG section 34 creating a rebuttable presumption of causation from transgenic crops.
Germany may well have a proper answer to this potential conflict by pointing to Directive Article
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Article 8.3(a) is a defense, not an exception, to the Directive on Environmental
Liability because the operator must prove that a third party caused the damage despite the
operator having taking appropriate safety measures.
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In 2003, a field trial of transgenic potatoes was destroyed by activists opposed to
agricultural biotechnology. N. Stafford, In the wake of a law seen as a major blow for science, a
major project’s funding dries up, THE SCIENTIST (Jan. 13, 2005). V. Fogleman, supra note 210
at 110 (commenting that the European Council meant for terrorism to be within the meaning of
Articles 4.1(a) and 8.3(a).) See also, Anon., Greenpeace on trial under Danish terror law after
GMO protest, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (June 9, 2005). But see, Anon., More anti-GM activists
acquitted by French court, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Jan. 12, 2006) and Anon., Activists’
destruction of GM crops was justified: French court, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Dec. 9, 2005).
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16.1 that allows Member States to adopt “more stringent provisions” including “the identification
of additional responsible parties.” Resolution of the issue of legal conflict between EU
Environmental Liability Directive and the German Genetic Engineering Law is a concern for the
future, if the issue ever arises.228
Article 8.4 sets forth a discretionary defense to operator liability under the Directive.
Article 8.4 reads as follows:
The Member States may allow the operator not to bear the cost of
remedial actions taken pursuant to this Directive where he
demonstrates that he was not at fault or negligent and that the
environmental damage was caused by:
(a) an emission or event expressly authorised by, and fully
in accordance with the conditions of, an authorisation conferred by
or given under applicable national laws and regulations which
implement those legislative measures adopted by the Community
specified in Annex III, as applied at the date of the emission or
event;
(b) an emission or activity or any manner of using a product
in the course of an activity which the operator demonstrates was
not considered likely to cause environmental damage according to
the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the
emission was released or the activity took place.
The defense in Article 8.4(a) is known as the “compliance-with-permit-conditions”
defense.229 However, in the 2004 amendments to the GenTG, Germany exercised its discretion in
section 36a.1 to impose liability for any adventitious presence of transgenic material. Section
36a.1 makes clear that Germany has not “expressly authorised” an emission or event of
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See text accompanying and authorities cited in notes 192 & 204-207 supra. See also,
C. Clarke supra note 210 at 266-268 (discussing potential conflicts between the EU Directive on
Environmental Liability and national laws in the various Member States.)
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L. Krämer supra note 210 at 11; V. Fogleman, supra note 210 at 110. Both authors
discuss the scope and meaning of the Art. 8.4(a) defense.
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adventitious presence even for approved transgenic crops. Consequently, Directive Article 8.4(a)
likely has no legal meaning as a defense for German farmers or research institutes growing
transgenic crops.
The defense of Article 8.4(b) is known as the “state-of-the-art” defense.230 However, in
the 2004 amendments to the GenTG, Germany exercised its discretion in section 36a.2 to state
that “compliance with good agricultural practices ... can be reasonably expected.” Section 36a.2
makes clear that the rules and regulations, no matter how stringent, promulgated by the Federal
Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture (BMVEL) constitute the state-of-the-art
for the purposes of liability for agricultural biotechnology. Consequently, whether the Article
8.4(b) defense has any practical meaning in Germany will depend upon the “good agricultural
practices” promulgated by BMVEL.
In summary, the German Parliament used its discretion under Directive Article 8.4 to
draft statutory language in section 36a of the GenTG that almost assuredly nullifies both defenses
of Article 8.4.
In light of the broad civil liability created by Section 36a of the GenTG, it is reasonable to
expect that non-governmental organizations will use the request-for-action provision of Directive
Article 12 quite often to seek protective actions and remedial actions related to water, land,
protected species, and natural habitats231 from adventitious presence of transgenic crops and
transgenic field trials. If the competent authority in German (BMVEL) is kindly receptive to
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V. Fogleman, supra note 210 at 110-111.
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For the definition of protected species and natural habitats in the EU Directive on
Environmental Liability, read note 212 supra.
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these requests, farmers and research institutions of transgenic organisms likely face substantial
administrative liability, in addition to civil liability, for engaging in agricultural biotechnology.
Neither Canada nor the United States – at the federal level – have an environmental
liability statute applicable to transgenic crops and transgenic field trials that is comparable to the
European Union Directive on Environmental Liability. Due to the interrelationship between the
EU Directive and the German GenTG, the potential administrative liability for agricultural
biotechnology is, therefore, significantly greater in Germany than in Canada and the United
States. However, as previously discussed, the Canadian Province of Saskatchewan has three
environmental statutes that allow civil liability (private law) lawsuits for environmental harms.232
The Saskatchewan statutes provide a contrasting model to the EU Directive which allows only
administrative liability (public law) for environmental harms. Yet, the Saskatchewan statutes,
like the EU Directive, may impose substantial liability upon agricultural biotechnology.
Criminal Liability
Sections 38 & 39 of the German GenTG prescribe fines and penal sanctions for violations
of the regulatory obligations contained in the prior sections of the Act. Fines and penal sanctions
for violations of environmental regulatory statutes are common. Thus, these two sections should
not be particularly threatening to transgenic farmers and research institutes. However, section
39.3 does establish a term of imprisonment of three months (implied as a minimum) but not
exceeding five years for any of a list of regulatory violations that “endangers the body or life of
another person, other property of considerable value or elements of the ecosystem of
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For discussion of the Saskatchewan environmental statutes, read text and
accompanying notes 76-90 supra.
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considerable ecological importance.” Criminal liability for endangerment of “elements of the
ecosystem of considerable ecological importance” appears to introduce a new criminal liability
that may create significant concerns for those engaged in agricultural biotechnology.
It is unclear whether criminal liability extends to legal persons (e.g. corporations) because
German penal law has traditionally not applied to legal persons because legal persons lack a
conscience.233 However, the EU Directive on Environmental Liability specifically imposes
liability upon both natural and legal persons.234 Therefore, Germany could adopt the EU
approach, including criminal liability for legal persons, when Germany transposes the EU
Directive into domestic law before 30 April 2007.
Germany has a special chapter of its penal code entitled “Crimes Against the
Environment.” However, this special chapter does not impose any new or unique criminal
liability upon those engaged in agricultural biotechnology.235
Legal Liability: Article 27 of The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
When the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (BSP) was finalized in January 2000, Article
27 addressed liability and redress.236 However, due to the contentious nature of the negotiations
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K. Gaynor & T. Bartman, supra note 99 at 91.
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Directive Art. 2.6 (definition of “operator”).
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For a general discussion of environmental crimes in Germany, R. Hüper, Application
of Criminal Environmental Law in Germany, Ch. 6 in F. Comte & L. Krämer (eds), supra note
152.
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For a brief history of the negotiations relating to Article 27, Secretariat of the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: A Record of
the Negotiations 82-84 (2003). [hereinafter Record of the Negotiations]
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about liability and redress,237 Article 27 did not provide any substantive resolution of the issues.
Rather, Article 27 created a process for further discussion of the issues after the BSP became
effective as an international agreement. Article 27 reads as follows:
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties
to this Protocol shall, at its first meeting, adopt a process with
respect to the appropriate elaboration of international rules and
procedures in the field of liability and redress for damage resulting
from transboundary movements of living modified organisms,
analysing and taking due account of the ongoing processes in
international law on these matters, and shall endeavour to complete
this process within four years."238
By its terms, the BSP would become effective ninety days after the fiftieth country had ratified
the BSP. This occurred in September 2003.
The Article 27 process began in October 2004, when the Secretariat CBD convened a
meeting of technical experts on liability and redress. The technical experts had the task of
preparing the background material necessary for the first full meeting of the Open-ended Ad-Hoc
Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Liability and Redress meeting in May
2005239.
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While the official history of the negotiations is the document cited in the preceding
footnote, the better feel for the contentiousness is found in C. Bail, R. Falkner & Helen
Marquard, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with
Environment and Development? (2002). With respect to Article 27 specifically, read W.
Damena, Liability and Redress, Ch. 40 at 366-370 in C. Bail et al, id.; and, K. Cooke, Liability:
“No Liability, No Protocol,” Ch. 41 at 371-384 in C. Bail et al, id.
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Cartagena Protocol on Biosaftey to the Convention on Biological Diversity: Text and
Annexes, Art. 27 at 20 (Secretariat CBD, 2000), available at http://www.bio-div.org. [hereafter
BSP]
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Report of the Technical Group of Experts on Liability and Redress in the Context of
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, UNEP/CBD/BS/TEG-L&R/1/3 (18-20 Oct 2004), available
at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meeting.aspx?mtg=BSTELR-01. [hereafter Technical Group]
The discussions at the October 2004 meeting addressed many distinct issues. For
72

At the October 2004 meeting, the Technical Group focused on three broad areas: first,
potential damage scenarios; second, the application of international rules and procedures; and
third, the elaboration of options for rules and procedures.240
Regarding damage scenarios, the Technical Group built upon damage scenarios
developed by a Workshop on Liability and Redress in the Context of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, that occurred in December 2002.241 The Technical Group discussion highlighted
three types of damage: damage to property; damage to human health; and damage to the
environment (with damage to biodiversity as a sub-category of damage to the environment).242

example, the Technical Group discussed the scope of the BSP Article 27 – whether it should be
read broadly to apply to all international shipments, transit through countries, handling and use
within specific countries, or narrowly to apply only to international shipments of genetically
modified organisms. Id. at ¶ 27 and Annex II. Scope of “Damage Resulting from Transboundary
Movements of LMOs.” For the purposes of this article, the authors desire to keep the focus on
scenarios of liability and the types of damage. Hence, the authors of this article purposefully do
not discuss many issues discussed at the Technical Group or at the Open-Ended Ad-Hoc
Working Group [hereafter Working Group]. The report of the Working Group is fully cited infra
note 253.
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Agenda Item 4 of the October 2004 meeting reads as follows:
4. Consideration of issues on liability and redress pursuant to Article 27 of the Protocol:
4.1.
Analysis of general issues relating to:
(a)
The potential and/or actual damage scenarios of concern that may
be covered under the Protocol in order to identify the situations for
which international rules and procedures referred to in Article 27
of the Protocol may be needed;
(b)
The application of international rules and procedures on liability
and redress to the damage scenarios of concern that may be
covered under Article 27 of the Protocol;
4.2
Elaboration of options for elements of rules and procedures referred to in
Article 27 of the Protocol. Id. at ¶ 10.
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Id. at ¶ 20.
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Id. at ¶¶ 23-24.
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However, the discussion also emphasized socio-economic damages, including spiritual and
cultural aspects of socio-economic damages.243
Regarding the application of existing international and/or regional agreements to
transgenic organisms as covered under Article 27, the Technical Group identified numerous
international and regional agreements that might serve as models or sources of provisions for
Article 27.244 However, the Co-Chair noted that none of these agreements specifically addressed
liability and redress for damage that could result from transboundary movements of genetically
modified organisms.245
Interestingly the Technical Group did not identify two other international agreements that
appear relevant. No mention was made of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade Organization, where Article 2.3 states:
Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary
measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including
243

Id. at ¶¶ 25.
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International instruments identified included:
• the work of the International Law Commission on international liability for the injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law;
• existing agreements on the transportation of hazardous goods such as nuclear waste and
the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
Regional instruments included:
• The Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from
Activities Dangerous to the Environment;
• Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament, the Council on
Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental
Damage;
• the Nordic Environmental Protection Convention; and
• the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. Id. at ¶¶ 32-36.
245

Id. at ¶ 36.
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between their own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary
and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which
would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade."246
Nor did the Technical group mention of the International Plant Protection Convention Article 1.4
which reads:
Where appropriate, the provisions of this Convention may be
deemed by contracting parties to extend, in addition to plants and
plant products, to storage places, packaging, conveyances,
containers, soil and any other organism, object or material capable
of harbouring or spreading plant pests, particularly where
international transportation is involved.247
While neither of these international agreements pertain directly to international liability, they deal
with it indirectly through the ability to use the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).248
Regarding the options for elements of rules and procedures, the Technical Group
compiled an extensive list of topics with multiple options under each topic: definition and nature
of damage; scope of damages; valuation of damage; threshold of damage; causation; channelling
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World Trade Organization (WTO), Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures.
247

International Plant Protection Convention.
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Disagreement between two WTO parties (i.e. countries) regarding the Sanitary and
Phytosanity (SPS), the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and GATT can be resolved though the
use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Thus, Argentina, Canada and the United States
brought a complaint against the European Union about their legal regime for agricultural
biotechnology and its products. The complaining countries sought a ruling against the EU for
loss of export markets in violation of the SPS, the TBT, and GATT – international agreements
governing international trade between parties. The WTO Panel ruled substantially in favor of
Argentina, Canada and the United States. WTO Interim Report of the Panel, European
Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 1029-1031
WT/DS291/Interim (7 Feb 2006) (¶¶ 8.1 to 8.10 present the overview of the conclusions and
recommendations).
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of liability; mechanisms of financial security; standing or the right to bring claims; choice of
instruments; settlement of claims; limitations on liability; and non-parties to the BSP.249
Specifically with respect to definition and nature of damage, the Technical Group identified the
following optional components:
• damage to environment;
• damage to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity;
• damage to human health;
• socio-economic damage, especially in relation to indigenous and local
communities;
• traditional damage of loss of life or personal injury, loss of property or damage
to property, and loss of income;
• cost of response measures.250
The Technical Group forwarded its report with annex of options to the first meeting of
the Open-ended Ad-Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Liability and
Redress for consideration.251 But as the Technical Group forwarded the report, the Technical
Group identified several areas where additional information regarding liability and redress of
transboundary movements of genetically modified organisms would benefit the larger Working
Group.252 Reading these recommendations for additional information, two points are of
249

Technical Group, supra note 239 at ¶¶ 37-113 and Annex.

250

Id. at Annex, III. Damage: A. Optional components for the definition of damage.
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Id. at ¶ 117.
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In the recommendations section of the Technical Group report, the following were
identified as areas where additional information was needed:
• The scientific analysis and assessment of risks involved in the transboundary movement
of living modified organisms in respect of which reference was made to the ongoing work under
the Biosafety Protocol;
• The determination of damage to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in
respect of which reference was made to the definition of biodiversity loss in paragraph 2 of
decision VII/30 of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity as well as
the on-going work on the framework of indicators under that Convention;
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particular importance for this article: the need for additional information on the determination of
damage to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and the need for additional
information on the determination of socio-economic damage. By commenting on the need for
additional information on these two points, the Technical Group highlighted (purposefully or
unintentionally) how vague and ill-defined these two types of damages are.
In the opening address to the meeting of the Working Group in May 2005, Dr.
Hamdallah Zedan, Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
indicated that the Working Group’s task was to "analyse relevant issues and elaborate options for
elements of international rules and procedures on liability and redress with a view to building
understanding and consensus on the nature and contents of those rules and procedures."253
The meeting agenda adopted by the Working Group had two items directly relating to an
international liability and redress regime – Agenda Item 3 and Agenda Item 4.254
• The determination of socio-economic damage in respect of which reference was made
to the ongoing work under Article 26 of the Biosafety Protocol;
• The availability of financial security to cover liability resulting from the transboundary
movement of living modified organisms and the prices at which such financial security is
available;
• The status of treaties that provide for third-party liability, including the number of
Parties and Signatories; relevant dates where possible; and an analysis of reasons why several of
those treaties have not entered info force;
• Recent developments in international law relating to liability and redress, including soft
law;
• The work under the International Law Commission with respect to State responsibility
and State liability.
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Report of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on
Liability and Redress under the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, UNEP/CBD/BS/COPMOP/2/11 (May 2005), available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/issues/liability2.aspx#.
[hereafter Working Group]
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Agenda item 3 stated, "Review of information relating to liability and redress for
damage resulting from transboundary movements of living modified organisms."
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In addressing Agenda Item 3, two separate presentations were made to the Party
representatives and other participants. The first was made by Ms. Muffy Koch and Mr. Piet van
der Meer, experts on risk analysis and assessment of transgenic organisms, explaining the
scientific analysis and assessment of risk involved in the transboundary movement of genetically
modified organism.255 Mr. Dan Ogolla, of the CBD Secretariat, made the second presentation on
state responsibility and state liability.256 Mr. Ogolla clarified that in international law the words
“state responsibility” refer to a breach of an international duty (i.e. an internationally wrongful
act) arising from an international legal obligation.257 By contrast, Mr. Ogolla explained that in
international law the words “state liability” refers to reparation or compensation for a harm
arising from acts not prohibited by international law.258 In accordance with its terms, the BSP
creates a system for the international transboundary movement of genetically modified
organisms. Hence, if states were made liable under Article 27 Liability and Redress, the term

Agenda item 4 was identical to agenda item 4 from the meeting of the Technical Group.
Read agenda item 4 supra note 239.
255

Working Group, supra note 253 at ¶¶ 22-23. The presentation by Ms. Koch and Mr.
van der Meer responded to the Technical Group’s recommendation that the Working Group have
additional information on scientific analysis and risk assessment. See the first bullet point set
forth supra note 252.
256

Working Group, supra note 253 at ¶ 27.

257

Id.

258

Id. The report of Mr. Ogolla responded to the Technical Group’s recommendation
that the Working Group have additional information on state responsibility and state liability.
See the last bullet point set forth supra note 252.
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“state
liability” is the terminology to apply to any responsibility that may accrue from this lawful
transboundary movement.259
The Working Group used four sessions over three days to address Agenda Item 4. As a
result of its deliberations, the Working Group adopted an annex that expanded the options related
to liability and redress that would be on the table for discussion at the second meeting of the
Working Group in February 2006.260 In the Annex to the Report of the first meeting, the
Working Group identified the options related to components of damage as follows:
• damage to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or its
components;
• damage to environment, including damage to conservation and sustainable use
of biological diversity or its components, impairment of soil quality, impairment of water quality,
impairment of air quality;
• damage to human health, including loss of life or personal injury, loss of
income, public health measures, impairment of health;
• socio-economic damage, especially in relation to indigenous and local
communities, including loss of income, loss of cultural, social and spiritual values, loss of food
security, loss of competitiveness;
• traditional damage, including loss of life or personal injury, loss of or damage to
property, economic loss;
• cost of restorative measures.261
In addition, the Working Group added an Option 6 to the choice of instruments: No instrument.
Option 6 would allow the Working Group to conclude, in accordance with the language of
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For additional discussion of the distinction between state responsibility and state
liability, read Note of the Executive Secretary, Liability and Redress in the Context of Paragraph
2 of Article 14 of the Convention on Biological Diversity: An Analysis of Pertinent Issues,
UNEP/CBD/EG-L&R/1/2 (12-14 Oct. 2005) ¶¶ 7-15. [hereafter Note of the Executive
Secretary].
260

Working Group, supra note 253 Annex and ¶ 45.
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Id. at Annex: II. Damage: A. Optional components for the definition of damage.
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Article 27, that no international liability and redress regime was the “appropriate elaboration” of
Article 27.262
While the parties to the BSP are discussing Article 27 liability and redress, the parties to
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) are discussing a separate, but parallel and crossfertilizing, liability and redress regime under CBD Article 14 paragraph 2.263 Article 14
paragraph 2 states:
The Conference of the Parties shall examine, on the basis of
studies to be carried out, the issue of liability and redress, including
restoration and compensation, for damage to biological diversity,
except where such liability is purely an internal matter.”264
Although the text of the CBD emerged from Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the Conference
of the Parties of the CBD meet for the first time in 1994, little progress has been made regarding
the issue of liability and redress under Article 14 paragraph 2. As the Report of the Group of
Legal and Technical Experts from the October 2005 meeting makes clear, the experts have
significant disagreements about many issues related to Article 14 paragraph 2. Specifically
relevant to this article, the Legal and Technical Experts evidenced significant disagreement about
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Id. at Annex: XII. Choice of Instrument, Option 6. Several delegates objected to the
inclusion of Option 6 in the Working Group. Id. at ¶ 52.
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Report of the Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Liability and Redress in the
Context of Paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Conventions on Biological Diversity,
UNEP/CBD/COP/8/27/Add.3 (18 October 2005) at ¶ 14. [hereafter Legal and Technical
Experts]. The COP-CBD will consider this Report at its eighth meeting in Curitiba, Brazil in
March 2006.
At the October 2005 meeting of the Legal and Technical Experts, the Co-Chair of the
Working Group on BSP Article 27 made a report about the discussions related to liability and
redress under the BSP. Id. at ¶¶ 11-14.
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Convention on Biological Diversity, Art. 14.2, available at http://www.biodiv.org.
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• the definition of damage to biological diversity or damage to the
environment;

265

• the threshold of damage that should exist before liability can arise;266
• the appropriateness of developing a liability and redress regime for the CBD;267
and
• the scope of a liability and redress regime for the CBD in light of exclusion in
Article 14 paragraph 2 of “purely internal matters.”268
Moreover, some experts pointed out that the background document269 prepared by the CBD
Secretariat for the Legal and Technical Experts relied on literature that “lacked an authoritative
scientific basis.”270 The Legal and Technical Experts regarding Article 14 paragraph 2 ended
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Id. at ¶¶ 19-22 and 29.
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Id at ¶¶ 30-32.
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Id. at ¶¶ 43-51. In ¶ 44, the document reports that “a number of experts suggested that
a general liability regime might not be appropriate, given the complexity of the issues, the broad
range of activities and the difficulty in defining damage to biological diversity.”
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Id. at ¶ 33.
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Note of the Executive Secretary, supra note 263.

270

Legal and Technical Experts, supra note 261 at ¶ 17.
In the background Note, the Executive Secretary referred to a Friends of the Earth
International statement and David Quist & Ignacio H. Chapela, 2001. Transgenic DNA
introgressed into Traditional Maize Landraces in Ozxaca, Mexico, NATURE vol.414, p. 541.
Note of the Executive Secretary, supra note 263 at ¶ 34. However, the Secretariat failed to
inform the delegates that the editors of Nature, in a subsequent edition, had written, “In light of
these discussions [about the Quist/Chapela article] and the diverse advice received, Nature has
concluded that the evidence available is not sufficient to justify the publication of the original
paper. As the authors nevertheless wish to stand by the available evidence for their conclusions,
we feel it best simply to make these circumstances clear, to publish the criticisms, the author’s
response and new data, and to allow our readers to judge the science for themselves.” 416
NATURE 600-601 (2003).
Moreover, in a scientific study published after the Executive Secretary had prepared the
Note for the Legal and Technical Experts, scientists found no evidence in 2003 and 2004 that
Mexican maize had any introgression of transgenic material. S. Ortiz-García et al., Absence of
Detectable Transgenes in local landraces of maize in Oaxaca, Mexico (2003-2004), Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences (2005). However, by October 2005 when the Legal and
Technical Experts met, the S. Ortiz-García et al. study was widely known, giving further
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their report with an Annex of Conclusions, without any setting forth of options for further
consideration, that by what it says and what it does not say evidences how far the COP-CBD is
from reaching any consensus about a liability and redress regime under Article 14 paragraph 2.
Having presented a review of the on-going discussions about liability and redress under
BSP Article 27 and CBD Article 14 paragraph 2, this article now turns to the potential legal and
economic implications of pursuing such an international regime. The article will first address the
legal interpretation of an international liability and redress regime, using the components for the
definition of damage presented by the Working Group on BSP Article 27,271 as applied to the five
scenarios presented in discussing the domestic legal regimes of Canada, Denmark, Germany, and
the United States. Following the legal discussion of the scenarios, this article will present an
economic perspective on the implementation of such a regime.
Civil Liability
The Working Group specified the possible components of the definition of damage as
follows:
• damage to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or its
components;
• damage to environment, including damage to conservation and sustainable use
of biological diversity or its components, impairment of soil quality, impairment of water quality,
impairment of air quality;
• damage to human health, including loss of life or personal injury, loss of
income, public health measures, impairment of health;

credence to the Nature 2003 statement that the evidence in 2001 did not justify the publication of
the original paper. Thus, experts referred to in ¶ 17 were correct to point out the lack of
authoritative scientific basis for the literature cited by the Executive Secretary both before and
after the Executive Secretary prepared the Note.
271

Working Group, supra note 253 at Annex: II. Damage: A. Optional Components for
the definition of damage
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• socio-economic damage, especially in relation to indigenous and local
communities, including loss of income, loss of cultural, social and spiritual values, loss of food
security, loss of competitiveness;
• traditional damage, including loss of life or personal injury, loss of or damage to
property, economic loss;
• cost of restorative measures.272
Scenario One: Claim for damages arising from an unapproved transgenic crop mixing
with commercial agricultural crops.
Scenario Two. Claim for damages arising from an approved transgenic crop mixing with
non-transgenic crops resulting in a loss of a premium for a person or company who intended to
sell a non-transgenic commodity or food product.
Scenario Three. Claim for damages arising from an approved transgenic crop mixing
with organic crops resulting in a loss of the organic label for the specific organic crop or of
organic certification for the organic farmer’s farm.273
Scenarios One, Two, and Three fit within the Working Group component of “traditional
damage, including loss of life or personal injury, loss of or damage to property, economic loss.”
Thus, Scenarios One, Two, and Three would be covered by the international liability and redress
regime of Article 27, if this traditional damage component were adopted as part of the regime.
But the question remains, should traditional damage become part of the international regime?
CBD Article 14 paragraph 2 explicitly states that its studies are about liability and redress
for “damage to biological diversity, except where such liability is purely an internal matter.”
BSP Article 27 is explicitly about “liability and redress for damage resulting from transboundary
movement” of genetically modified organisms. By the language of these two provisions, it
seems unlikely that traditional damages should be part of any international liability regime for
several reasons.
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Id.
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M. Migus, supra note 28.
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As previously shown in this article, Canada, Denmark, Germany and the United States all
have statutes or case law dealing specifically with traditional damage – unapproved crops
entering the market, personal injury, property damage, and economic loss (“pure economic
loss”). Moreover, these countries do not deal with Scenarios One, Two and Three in the same
manner. Wide disparities exist between the domestic law regimes of these four countries,
particularly with respect to liability for adventitious presence and for “pure economic loss.”
Hence, to include traditional damage within an international liability and redress regime would
require a harmonization of domestic laws that is highly unlikely to occur. More to the point, if
countries are unwilling to harmonize their domestic laws, these countries are unlikely to agree to
a consensus for an international liability and redress regime.274
In addition, including traditional damage within an international liability and redress
regime may significantly displace domestic liability and redress regimes that individual nations
have developed from their own legal traditions and political history and compromises. While it
is possible to imagine traditional damage occurring from transboundary movements, it is much
more likely that pollen flow between fields or unapproved release will occur within a particular
county – geographically internal to a particular country. Countries are more likely to consider
these liability and redress concerns as purely internal matters related to that country’s particular
rules about coexistence and product liability.
The legal systems of most countries, even if additional capacity building for development
of legal systems would be helpful to some countries, are familiar with and competent to handle
274

For fuller discussion of the difficulties of harmonization and agreement, Katharina
Kummer Peiry, Biosafety Protocol Process on Liability and Redress: Food for Thought on Key
Issues – Paper No. 14, Why Have Existing Civil Liability Treaties Failed to Enter into Force? (21
Feb 2006), available at www.econsult.ch.
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traditional damage such as set forth in Scenarios One, Two and Three. To include traditional
damage such as Scenarios One, Two and Three in an international liability and redress regime
seems unnecessarily duplicative of already functioning regimes, and complicating for reaching
agreement under Article 27.
Furthermore, traditional damage such as set forth in Scenarios One, Two and Three has
little if anything to do with damage to biological diversity. Claims for loss of premiums arising
from labeling laws or organic production have nothing to do with biological diversity. These
claims about premiums are purely claims arising from competing, alternative approaches to
agriculture. Claims arising from unapproved crops mixing with commercial agriculture come
from regulatory laws that are not focused on biological diversity but on risk assessment and risk
management (in which environmental impacts are assessed and managed).
The best option for Scenarios One, Two and Three is the “no option,” – that is, to have
no international liability and redress regime addressing traditional damage.275
Scenario Four. Claim for damages arising from the loss of market access. For example,
where a buyer decides against buying a farmer’s crop even though there was no evidence of
transgenic material or the evidence of transgenic material was below legally-set thresholds.
Scenario Five. Claim for damages arising from a decision by a farmer to forgo planting a
particular crop because of concern about proximity to transgenic crops or market perception
about transgenic crops.276
Scenarios Four and Five could fit within the Working Group component of “traditional
damage, including ... economic loss.” Treating Scenarios Four and Five as traditional damage
275

For a conclusion on similar grounds that traditional damage should be excluded from
any Article 27 liability and redress regime, K. Holtby, International Liability and Trade in
Genetically Modified Products – Possibility or Improbability?, Ch. 3 Theoretical Model, 3.1
Background, especially pp. 86-87, Thesis for the Degree of Master of Science, University of
Saskatchewan Library (2005). [hereinafter Holtby Thesis].
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UK REPORT: GM Crops?, supra note 35 at p. 4 suggesting Scenarios Four and Five.
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(economic loss) would be treating Scenarios Four and Five under Article 27 as these two
scenarios were treated in the discussions of the domestic legal regimes of Canada, Denmark,
Germany, and the United States. In those domestic legal regimes, Scenarios Four and Five raised
the issue of whether the legal system compensated for “pure economic loss.” As the discussion
of those domestic legal regimes indicated, those legal regimes generally do not compensate for
pure economic loss, except for the 2004 amendments to the GenTG of Germany.

If Scenarios

Four and Five were classified as traditional damage (economic loss) under the Working Group
components for Article 27, the discussion presented about Scenarios One, Two, and Three under
Article 27 would be equally applicable to Scenarios Four and Five. Moreover, for the same
reasons as presented with regard to Scenarios One, Two and Three under Article 27, the same
conclusion should also follow – that is, to have no international liability and redress regime
addressing traditional damage.
However, Scenarios Four and Five may better fit within the Working Group component
of “socio-economic damage, especially in relation to indigenous and local communities,
including loss of income, loss of cultural, social and spiritual values, loss of food security, loss of
competitiveness.” Thus, Scenarios Four and Five would be covered by the international liability
and redress regime of Article 27, if this socio-economic component were adopted as part of the
regime. But the question remains, should socio-economic damage become part of the
international regime?
Including socio-economic damage within the Article 27 liability and redress regime
(particularly when including loss of income, loss of cultural-social-spiritual values, and loss of
competitiveness) is equivalent to making those who are engaged in production and export of
86

genetically modified organisms pay for the changes which inevitably will occur with the
introduction of any new technology. In both the Report of the Technical Group and the Report of
the Legal and Technical Experts, various delegates commented that the liability and redress
regime should not make a legally responsible party (be that party a Nation State, a corporation, or
an individual human being)277 legally accountable for change alone.278 Indeed, those countries
and companies engaged in the development, production, and export of genetically modified
organisms may well have pride in their innovativeness and perceive no reason why they should
compensate those who have failed to remain competitive, who feel they have lost income, or who
feel that their cultural-social-spiritual values have been affected.
It is not obvious why Brazil, China or India, each with exceptionally talented agricultural
biotechnology scientists and exceptionally strong agricultural biotechnology research
programs,279 should compensate another nation claiming non-competitiveness (including loss of
income) or cultural-social-spiritual change because of imported Brazilian, Chinese, or Indian
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The Working Group identified the options for channelling of liability as follows:
• state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts;
• primary state liability for acts even if in full compliance with the obligations of

the BSP;
• residual state liability in combination with primary liability of operator for acts
even if in full compliance with the obligation of the BSP;
• no state liability but with civil liability for one or more of the following persons,
including the developer, the producer, the notifier, the exporter, the importer, the carrier, or the
supplier. Working Group, supra note 253 at IV. Channelling of Liability, Role of Parties of
Import and Export, Standard of Liability.
278

Technical Group, supra note 239 at ¶ 27; Legal and Technical Experts, supra note 263

at ¶ 19.
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Even if the BSP Article 27 negotiators choose not to make Nation states liable, Brazil,
China and India could still be liable through the civil liability options as a developer, producer,
notifier, or exporter of their transgenic crops created through public research.
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transgenic plants or materials as crops for farmers to grow or as commodities for food or feed.280
More pertinently, it is not obvious why Brazil, China and India would agree to an international
liability and redress regime that would expose their public research institutions to being held
legally accountable for socio-economic damage.
In October 2004, Mr. René Lefeber, Co-Chair of the Technical Group, pointed out that
third-party liability (e.g. developer, producer, etc.) had been contentious in prior negotiations and
cautioned the negotiators “to learn from past experience with a view to preventing the adoption
of rules and procedures on liability and redress under Article 27 of the Protocol that would not
become operational.”281 At the CBD Article 14 paragraph 2 negotiations, the Note of the
Executive Secretary highlighted that a significant number of international liability and redress
280

Brazil: Embrapa (Brazilian Agricultural Research Company) has made a strategic
decision to become a creator of transgenic crops. As of January 2006, Embrapa has created
fourteen transgenic species that are ready for commercialization to farmers in Brazil and around
the world. Eduardo Mamcasz, Brazil’s state firm Embrapa creates 14 transgenic species. Seeds
are for sale, BRAZZIL MAGAZINE (Jan 2006), www.brazzilmag.com.
China: At the 7th Asian-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) in Beijing on December 2,
2003, Mr. Zhang Fengtong, Ministry of Agriculture-Department of Science and Education,
explained that the Chinese governmental program in agricultural biotechnology involved more
than 100 different genes and 130 different plant species. AgBioView Listserve (8 Dec. 2003).
Moreover, it has been reported that the Chinese government has invested $180 million dollars
into biotechnology from 1996 to 2000 and has plans to invest another $600 million between 2000
and 2005 in 300 publicly-funded laboratories employing 20,000 researchers. Anon, Chinese
Biotechnology: Biotech’s Yin and Yang, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 12, 2002).
India: In March 2004, India commercialized the first transgenic cotton developed by
Indian researchers at the National Botanical Research Institute (NBRI). Simultaneously, NBRI
stated its intentions to patent the transgenic cotton in other countries and to export the cotton and
the technology. K. Jayaraman, India Produces Homegrown GM Cotton, 22 NAT. BIOTECH. 255
(2004). Also in March 2004, the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) decided to
develop transgenic varieties of 14 selected crops, specifically rohu, catfish, rice, sorghum, maize,
pigeonpea, chickpea, cotton, tomato, brinjal, soybean, potato, banana, and papaya. Anon, ICAR
to develop transgenic kind of 14 crops, INDIAN EXPRESS NEWS (10 Mar 2004).
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Technical Group, supra note 239 at ¶¶ 8 and 36.
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regimes had not become effective despite the passage of many years since adoption in
negotiations.282 Including socio-economic damage within any Article 27 liability and redress
regime may well doom the regime from every becoming operational. Or in the alternative, if an
Article 27 liability and redress regime became operational, countries that become developers,
producers and exporters of transgenic crops and animals would have an enormous incentive to
withdraw from the BSP in order to terminate its consent to being held accountable for socioeconomic damage.283
Leaving aside whether including socio-economic damage is wise, a more fundamental
question may be whether the inclusion of socio-economic damages within the Article 27 liability
and redress regime is legally permissible under the BSP.
The word “socio-economic” appears in only one article of the BSP. Article 26 SocioEconomic Considerations reads in full:
1. The Parties, in reaching a decision on import under this
Protocol or under it domestic measures implementing the Protocol,
282

Note of the Executive Secretary, supra note 263 at ¶ 40. The Executive Secretary
listed the 1977 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage resulting from
Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources; the 1996 International
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in connection with the Carriage of
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea; the 1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and
Compensation for Damage resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal; the 1989 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage caused during Carriage of
Dangerous Goods By Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels; and the 1993 Lugano
Convention. Id.
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BSP, supra note 238 Article 39 Withdrawal. Parties can withdraw from the BSP by
giving notice and the passage of one year from the date of receipt of the notice by the Secretariat.
Of course, a particular nation, even if it had developed, produced, or exported transgenic
organisms, would have no incentive to withdraw if the nation were willing to abandon its
agricultural biotechnology investments and innovations. At that point, such nation would
probably be looking to make money from agricultural biotechnology by becoming a claimant for
socio-economic damage.
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may take into account, consistent with their international
obligations, socio-economic considerations arising from the impact
of living modified organisms on the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity, especially with regard to the value of
biological diversity to indigenous and local communities.
2. The Parties are encouraged to cooperate on research and
information exchange on any socio-economic impacts of living
modified organisms, especially on indigenous and local
communities.284
Reading the language of Article 26 clearly shows that socio-economic considerations may
be taken into account in “reaching a decision on import” and “to cooperate on research and
information exchange” about impacts of transgenic crops. Article 26 allows socio-economic
considerations only for these two reasons. Nowhere does Article 26 indicate that socio-economic
considerations are permissible for any other reason under the BSP. Nowhere does either the
language of Article 26 or Article 27 authorize the consideration of socio-economic impacts as a
form of damage for a liability and redress regime.285
In other words, under Article 26, countries may take into account socio-economic
considerations in making the decision on import. But once the country has made the decision on
import, the country has accepted the transgenic organism along with the change that the
introduction of new technology brings. Countries should not be allowed to consent on import
and then later claim that any resulting change arising from that consent should now result in
liability and redress under Article 27. Under Article 26 countries may choose either to have
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BSP, supra note 238 at Article 26.
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Similarly one expert at the CBD Article 14 paragraph 2 discussions stated that socioeconomic damage fell outside the mandate of the Group because socio-economic damage was
not within the scope of Article 14 paragraph 2. Legal and Technical Experts, supra note 263 at ¶
25.
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agricultural biotechnology or to decline agricultural biotechnology but they cannot later attempt
to recover for socio-economic damage resulting from the decision that the country has made.286
In addition to the very limited, explicitly-stated reasons for which socio-economic
considerations are relevant by the language of BSP Articles 26 & 27, the history of the
negotiations of Article 26 also indicates that socio-economic considerations are not permissibly a
type of damage for liability and redress. At one point in the BSP negotiations, proponents of
socio-economic considerations were able to get an option included for negotiation which option
would have allowed socio-economic considerations “to be taken into consideration at all levels
of this Protocol.”287 When no agreement could be reached on that option, the Chair proposed a
text which circumscribed socio-economic considerations to language quite similar to the present
Article 26. As the Record of the Negotiations then reports,
Although many delegations, especially developing countries, were
initially unhappy with the Chair’s proposed text, the wording on
286

For example, if a country denied import of agricultural biotechnology from Brazil,
China or India under Article 26, the authors think it would seem surprisingly strange for that
country to be allowed under Article 27 to claim liability and redress against Brazil, China or
India for loss of competitiveness because Brazil, China or India proceeded ahead with
agricultural biotechnology while the country denying import decided not to utilize agricultural
biotechnology.
However, proponents of socio-economic damages have consistently attacked agricultural
biotechnology on the ground, among others, that agricultural biotechnology could lead to
substitution products – i.e. agricultural products produced from transgenic agriculture more
cheaply – and that the substitution product could replace export products grown by conventional
and organic agriculture. The argument for socio-economic damage by the country denying
import is now clear. Transboundary movement of transgenic crops – i.e. the substitute products
being purchased in international trade – has caused socio-economic damage to the countries
without the technology. Therefore, the developer, producer, exporter should bear the market loss
(loss of competitiveness) of the country that does not have the transgenic crop. Nuffield Council
on Bioethics, Genetically Modified Crops: The Ethical and Social Issues ¶ 4.31 (1999).
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Record of the Negotiations, supra note 236 at 80.
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socio-economic consideration was ultimately accepted with little
discussion.288
As it appears unwise to declare change itself to be a type of damage, and as it appears that
socio-economic considerations are not permissibly a type of damage within the remit of Article
27, the best option for Scenarios Four and Five is the “no option,” – that is, to have no
international liability and redress regime addressing socio-economic considerations.289
Scenario Six: (Option one) Damage to conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity and its components; (Option two) Damage to environment, including damage to
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or its components, impairment of soil
quality, impairment of water quality, impairment of air quality.
Scenario Seven: Damage to human health, including loss of life or personal injury, loss of
income public health measures, impairment of health.290
Scenarios Six and Seven were not explicitly discussed previously with respect to civil
legal liability within the domestic legal regimes of Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the United
States. However, these two scenarios were indirectly addressed under the heading of
Administrative Liability for each of the domestic legal regimes analyzed in this article.291 What
is distinctive about Scenarios Six and Seven within the context of Article 27 liability and redress
is that the Article 27 negotiations are considering Scenarios Six and Seven as types of damage for
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Id. at 80-81.

289

For a conclusion on similar grounds that socio-economic considerations should be
excluded from any Article 27 liability and redress regime, Holtby Thesis, supra note 275, Ch. 3
Theoretical Model, 3.1 Background, especially pp. 86-88.
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Scenarios Six and Seven are taken from the Working Group options. Working Group,
supra note 253 at Annex: II. Damage: A. Optional Components for the definition of damage.
291

For discussion of Administrative Liability within the several domestic legal regimes
analyzed in this article, read text and accompanying notes 69-96 supra (Canada and the United
States), text and accompanying notes 147-150 supra (Denmark), and text and accompanying
notes 208-232 supra (Germany).
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civil legal liability. When this article earlier discussed, in an indirect fashion, Scenarios Six and
Seven, the article did so as part of administrative liability (i.e. as part of public regulatory
schemes) and not as part of a claim for damage as liability and redress.
Scenario Six has two options that need clarification – Option one solely on biological
diversity; Option two on environmental damage that subsumes biological diversity as a subtype
of environmental damage. Option one solely on biological diversity aims to focus on damage to
the variability of species and habitats before and after the introduction of transgenic agriculture.
Option two focuses on the damage to specific components of the environment (e.g. soil quality,
water quality, air quality) and, by working to remedy soil, water, and air quality, to protect the
habitats and their species, both of which are components of biological diversity.292
Scenario Seven also requires clarification. Scenario Seven aims to focus not on shortterm human health reactions to transgenic crops, such as an immediate allergic reaction, because
these short-term human health concerns would be covered by traditional damage as personal
injury. Rather, Scenario Seven aims to focus on long-term human health reactions to transgenic
crops, such as medical problems from long-term exposure resulting in death, health impairment,
or loss of quality of life. Scenario Seven differs from traditional damage by the time-scale (the
long-term) meant to be encompassed within Scenario Seven.293
Scenarios Six and Seven would be covered by the international liability and redress
regime of Article 27, if biological diversity damage and/or environmental damage, and human
292

Biological diversity as compared to environmental damage is discussed in Technical
Group, supra note 239 at ¶¶ 39 & 46, in Note of the Executive Secretary, supra note 259 at ¶¶
16-17, 38 and in Legal and Technical Experts, supra note 263 at ¶¶ 20-22.
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Technical Group, supra note 239 at ¶ 43 & 56; Note of the Executive Secretary, supra
note 259 at ¶ 16.
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long-term health concerns were adopted as part of the regime. But the question remains, should
these types of damage become part of the international regime?
Some delegates to the meetings about liability and redress under either BSP Article 27 or
CBD Article 14 paragraph 2 have pointed out that damage to biological diversity and
environmental damage (Scenarios Six), as general terms, are overly broad and difficult to define
because lacking concrete references,294 likely to impose liability for change alone,295 likely to
impose liability for beneficial changes or insignificant harms unless a significant threshold of
adverse impact modifies these terms,296 and difficult to measure unless careful, accurate baseline
studies exist.297
As a consequence of the difficulties with the concepts of biological diversity (pointed out
in the preceding paragraph), the European Union in its Environmental Liability Directive chose
to exclude consideration of biological diversity, as defined in the CBD, as a type of damage and
linked damage to identifiable environmental components (soil, water, protected species,
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Technical Group, supra note 239 at ¶ 42; Legal and Technical Experts, supra note 263
at ¶¶ 20, 28 & 48.
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Technical Group, supra note 239 at ¶ 27; Note of the Executive Secretary, supra note
259 at ¶ 19; Legal and Technical Experts, supra note 263 at ¶¶ 17 & 19.
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Note of the Executive Secretary, supra note 259 at ¶ 19; Legal and Technical Experts,
supra note 263 at ¶¶ 29 & 31.
As pointed out by the Canadian judge in Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada, if the
environmental damage is not limited to an adverse impact, environmental damage could be
interpreted to include even kindly, gentle, favorable, and beneficial environmental effects. Read
note 82 supra and its accompanying text. Of course such a result would be the imposition of
legal liability for change alone.
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Report of the Technical Group, supra note 239 at ¶ 45, 55 & 57; Legal and Technical
Experts, supra note 263 at ¶¶ 22 & 32.
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protected habitats).298 While the European Environmental Liability Directive uses the term
“biological diversity,” the usage within the Liability Directive refers only to protected species
and protected habitats. Thus, the Liability Directive’s biological diversity is much narrower than
the term “biological diversity” in the CBD.299
With respect to both damage to biological diversity and/or the environment, and longterm human health damage, the issue of causation will be a very difficult issue. With the passage
of many years – ten, twenty, thirty – years before countries or others300 possibly make claims
alleging damage to biological diversity, the environment, or long-term human health, delegates to
the BSP Article 27 negotiations pointed out that identifying when a harm occurred, the
complexities of causal interactions, and the responsible party(ies) would be a very difficult task
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Note of the Executive Secretary, supra note 259 at ¶¶ 16 &19; Legal and Technical
Experts, supra note 263 at ¶ 21.
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For a fuller discussion of the European Environmental Liability Directive, read Legal
Liability: Germany Administrative Liability.
300

The authors do not discuss the issue as to who – e.g. countries, individual,
corporations, or NGOs – will gain standing to bring a claim. In the 2nd meeting of the Working
Group on Liability and Redress, the issue of standing was presented for discussion but no
participant chose to speak to the issue. Obviously, standing is an issue that awaits much fuller
development and debate. WGLR-2 Final, 9 (#345) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. 11 (27 Feb.
2006). See also, Katharina Kummer Peiry, supra note 274 at Paper No. 10 Only Persons or
Entities Directly Impacted Can Bring a Claim (26 Apr 2005).
Moreover, if individuals, corporations, or NGOs are given standing to bring a claim, the
authors do not discuss whether they could sue their own governments, under an Article 27
Liability and Redress regime, for causing the particular alleged loss because their own country, as
an example, gave consent on the import of a transgenic crop.
These issues of standing and responsible parties are particularly important with respect to
socio-economic damage. For example, read note 286 supra.
Of course individuals can use their countries’ domestic laws on coexistence and legal
liability to seek recovery for alleged harms, as discussed in the comparative law sections of this
article about the legal regimes of Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the United States.
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for the international negotiations.301 Mr. René Lefeber, Co-Chair of the BSP Article 27
negotiations, commented specifically that the issue of causation had most often been left to
judicial determination during adjudication, rather than addressed in international agreements.302
The time-scale contemplated by Scenarios Six and Seven and the difficulty of causation
flowing from this lengthy time-scale should be of particular importance to international
negotiators. Since the adoption of the CBD in 1992 and the BSP in 2000, the two most
prominent claims for human health and environmental damage have been shown to be without an
authoritative scientific basis.

# In the United States, in the aftermath of the commingling of StarLink™ corn,
approved only for feed, with the food supply, several persons claimed allergic reactions to food
products containing some remnant of StarLink™. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) subsequently conducted appropriate tests and concluded that “findings do not
provide any evidence that the reactions that the affected people experiences were associated with
hypersensitivity to the Cry9c protein [the StarLink™ transgenic protein].”303
301

Technical Group, supra note 239 at ¶¶ 64, 66, 67;
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Technical Group, supra note 239 at ¶ 64; Legal and Technical Experts, supra note 263
at ¶ 36. Working Group, supra note 253 listed the causation options for further consideration as
follows:
• level of regulation (international/or domestic level);
• establishment of the causal link between damage and the activity, including what
test (foreseeability, direct/indirect damage, proximate cause, vulnerability clause), cumulative
effects, and complexity of interaction of genetically modified organisms with the receiving
environment and time scales involved;
• burden of proof, including relaxation of the burden of proof, reversal of the
burden or proof, burden of proof on the exporter and importer. Id. at Annex: III. Causation.
303

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Investigation of Human Health Effects
Associated with Potential Exposure to Genetically Modified Corn (2001) (quoted words from the
Executive Summary).
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# In Mexico, statements were made that transgenic corn had “contaminated”
indigenous landraces, causing loss of biological diversity. Later developments (scientific
criticism of the initial statements and a subsequent study) established that no traces of crosspollination could be found and that, if any cross-pollination had ever occurred, that the crosspollination had been reversed within two years.304
If international negotiators do not pay careful attention to the issues of time-scale and
causation, the negotiators may allow numerous claims lacking an authoritative scientific basis to
be brought against those to whom liability and redress are channelled.
More fundamental in consideration of whether Scenarios Six and Seven should become
part of the international regime than the difficulties of definition, threshold, baseline, time-scale,
and causation is the question of the nature of agricultural biotechnology. As some delegates to
the negotiations emphasized, agricultural biotechnology (in its ten years of performance within
commercial agricultural systems) has not given rise to any verified claim of environmental
damage, loss of biological diversity, or human health problems.305 Hence, to include Scenarios
Six and Seven within the types of damages for which claims could be brought in any Article 27
liability and redress regime would be to give legal recognition to speculative claims – i.e. claims
that have no present factual basis and no determinable probability of becoming factual in the
future.306
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For fuller discussion of this Mexican corn episode, read note 270 supra.
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Legal and Technical Experts, supra 263 at ¶ 17.
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Ms. Kareen Holtby, in her University of Saskatchewan Master’s Thesis, explains
speculative risks. She writes, “Speculative risks are the least predictable. Like hypothetical
risks, they have not been observed. However, their cause and effect relationship is not
understood either. Thus, the probability of their occurrence cannot be assigned.” Holtby Thesis,
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Additionally, as one CBD Article 14 paragraph 2 delegate stated, agricultural
biotechnology is not inherently dangerous.307 Negotiations for the creation of previous
international liability and redress regimes have focused on inherently dangerous activities.308
Even with respect to the international negotiations about liability and redress for acknowledged
inherently dangerous activities, the negotiations have been contentions, slow-moving, and (even
when a text has been produced) very difficult to bring into force as binding international
agreements.309 Hence, to include speculative claims– related to long-term biological diversity,
environmental, or human health damage within an Article 27 liability and redress regime – for a
product not inherently dangerous may well mean that even if a text for the regime is ultimately
adopted that the text will never become operational.310
It is not obvious why – to select three countries as examples – Cuba, Denmark, or Iran
would agree to a text or ultimately ratify a text that would subject themselves, their public
research institutions, and private companies to claims ten-twenty-thirty years in the future for

supra note 275 at 4 Fn. 4.
Ms. Holtby agrees that to include biological diversity, the environment, and long-term
human health claims within the Article 27 liability and redress regime would be to recognize
speculative risks as a legitimate basis for international claims. Id. at 4 fn. 4, 83-86, 89, 94 fn. 15,
100 fn. 19, and 108-109. For reasons to be explained in a few paragraphs, Ms. Holtby considers
inclusion of speculative risks within the Article 27 liability and redress regime to be a proper and
correct decision.
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Legal and Technical Experts, supra note 263 at ¶ 17.
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Note of the Executive Secretary, supra note 259 at ¶¶ 14-15 & 39.
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Note of the Executive Secretary, supra note 259 at ¶¶ 14-15 & 39-40.
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See, Technical Group, supra note 239 at ¶ 36. See also, Katharina Kummer Peiry,
supra note 274 at Paper No. 8, Strict Liability for Environmental Damage is Normally Reserved
for Hazardous Activities (12 Apr 2005).
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speculative damages related to biological diversity, the environment, or human health.311 It is not
obvious why these three nations would be willing to consent to allow antagonistic countries,
natural or legal persons, or NGOs to bring these types of claims for damage against their
biotechnology sectors.312 Cuba, Denmark, Iran approved the transgenic organisms (microorganisms, crops, or animals) developed, produced, and exported in or from their countries.
Moreover, the countries in which the damage to biological diversity, the environment, or human
health will be alleged to have occurred ten-twenty-thirty years hence will have also consented to
the import of the transgenic organisms after an approval process. With two approvals
determining safety to biological diversity, the environment, and human health, it seems that
nations and their developers, producers, and exporters of genetically modified organisms may
311

Cuba has a sophisticated biotechnology sector focused on pharmaceuticals and foods.
In 2006 Cuba is field testing transgenic corn, rice, sweet potatoes, and sugar cane with the goal to
commercialize these varieties by 2010 for use in Cuba and other nations around the world.
Anon, Cuba goes it alone with new biotech crops, AGBIOTECH REPORTER 12-13 (Jan. 2006).
Denmark is home to Novo Nordisk, maybe the largest developer in the world of
transgenic food-processing aids (bacteria and yeasts) and their enzyme products. Novo Nordisk
has already felt the panic of speculative claims in Japan when bread made in New Zealand, using
an imported Novo Nordisk enzyme produced by a genetically modified organism, was forced
from the market shelves. Anon, Govt baffled by GE scare, questions of timing of revelation,
NZOOM (27 Oct 2003).
Iran developed transgenic rice and is the first country in the world to release transgenic
rice for commercial production by farmers. D. Aglay, Iran, First to Plant GMO Rice, Hopes to
Cut Imports, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE (Nov. 21, 2005).
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Who will have standing to bring claims under the BSP Article 27 liability and redress
regime is another legal issue still under discussion. The options listed for further discussion are
• damage to environment/conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity –
affected state; groups acting in vindication of common interests;
• damage to human health – affected state; affected person or any other person
entitled to act on behalf of that person;
• socio-economic damage – affected state; groups acting in vindication of
common interests or communities. Working Group, supra note 253 at Annex: VIII.
Standing/Right to Bring Claims.
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well see no reason why they should subject themselves to speculative claims for damage awards
based on alleged long-term impact on biological diversity, the environment, and human health.
In light of the difficulties in concepts, scientific knowledge, and operative adoption, the
best option for Scenarios Six and Seven from a legal perspective appears to be the “no option,” –
that is, to have no international liability and redress regime addressing biological diversity,
environmental, and long-term human health damage.
However, the legal perspective may not adequately encompass relevant economic
considerations that possibly provide solid policy reasons for the adoption of an Article 27
liability and redress regime. It has been carefully and thoughtfully argued that countries with
concerns about these speculative risks (biological diversity, environmental harm, and long-term
human health) will not participate in international trade in agricultural biotechnology unless their
concerns can be adequately addressed by a liability and redress regime. It is argued that an
Article 27 liability and redress regime will provide assurances to these risk-averse countries that
if something, though presently speculative, does occur that the risk-averse countries will have
prevention, restoration, and compensation remedies.313 Hence, it is possible to argue that a social
welfare maximizing BSP must create a liability and redress regime so as to entice the greatest
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The authors of this article do not discuss the final option set forth by the Working
Group in its damage options – i.e. costs of response measures. Costs of response measures seem
more closely related to remedies (prevention, restoration, or monetary compensation) once
liability for a legally-recognized damage has occurred. Hence, cost of response measures seems
to be on the redress side, rather than the liability side, of the Article 27 regime. This article
focuses on “liability” and not on “redress.” For discussion about options related to redress, Note
of the Executive Secretary, supra note 259 at ¶¶ 20-26 and Legal and Technical Experts, supra
note 263 at ¶¶ 23, 27 and Annex: Conclusions 7 and 8.
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number of countries to participate in international trade in agricultural biotechnology.314 It is to
this economic argument that this article now turns.
As was stated previously, the Holtby Thesis posits that a liability and redress regime can
be welfare enhancing. Her arguments are based on two assumptions that bear further analysis.
Assumption One: Holtby argues that speculative harms need to be included in an
international liability and redress regime to ensure that any potentially adverse long-term
environmental and health impacts within developing and less developed nations will be
compensated. Without the possibility for compensation, developing and less developed countries
will not adopt agricultural biotechnology.
Assumption Two: Holtby argues that a liability and redress regime is welfare enhancing
when contrasted against the alternative of an importing nation imposing an import barrier against
GMOs "… as the liability regime serves to reduce the expected costs of importing GMOs so that
the benefits outweigh the costs."315
Speculative harms or risks are undoubtedly the most contentious of the risk categories
given the lack of capability to substantiate this category of risks. In 1997, van den Daele et al.
identified three categories of risk316 based on research into consumer perceptions of genetic
modification technologies. The first category of risks are probabilistic risks, defined as those that
involve theoretically grounded and empirically demonstrated risks related to the product or its
technology. The methods and much of the evidence about probabilistic risks is available in peer314
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reviewed journals or public records. The second category, hypothetical risks, in contrast involve
those possibilities that are grounded in accepted theory but lack empirical experience or evidence
that can establish probabilities. Most of these hypothetical risks can be identified in academic
literature. The third category, speculative risks, in contrast to the other two identified risks, have
neither established theory nor empirical experience to indicate their existence in the real world.
Those speculative risks that have garnered attention can be found in working papers or other
developing (popular) literature. Beyond these thought exercises, almost any correlation can be
made to show the potential for risk, irrespective of whether there is any theoretical basis for the
speculative possibility.317
Irrespective of the tendency in the BSP to be focused more on social rationality rather
than scientific rationality, in contrast to the WTO agreements,318 international consensus on a
liability and redress regime will likely not be reached if it is principled on the abstract concept of
speculative risks. While some countries may see inclusion of speculative risks as a necessary
condition of a liability and redress regime, there is a very high probability that a regime including
speculative risks would join the list of international liability and redress regimes that have been
negotiated but never enacted.319
Developers of new agricultural biotechnology crops and animals – be they public or
private; be they in industrialized or developing countries – would be hindered by the inclusion of
317
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speculative risks in a liability and redress regime, especially public researchers in developing
countries (e. g. International Rice Research Institute in The Philippines). While it is conceivable
that private developers in industrialized countries could absorb the cost of any out-year liability
without having substantial adverse impacts on the development of new biotechnologies, the same
cannot be said for public developers, especially in developing countries. Public research
institutes simply do not have comparable rates of return or financial pools of capital capable of
being utilized to fund future liability costs. In this case, the potential of a future liability cost
could adversely affect both the direction of agricultural research and its effectiveness in
addressing developmental needs.
Moreover, inclusion of speculative risks in an international liability and redress regime
appears to contradict the objectives of the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). Goal Seven of this project is to ensure environmental sustainability. The authors of a
recent report on achieving the goals have stated that decentralization of research capacity and
increasing research self-determination will be crucial to achieving the MDGs.320 The key focus
of the MDGs is to work with developing countries to alleviate hunger and poverty by
encouraging the integration of local interests and initiatives.321
The implementation of an Article 27 liability and redress regime could certainly be
expected to have an adverse effect on achieving the MDGs in developing countries. Public
320
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research institutes, especially those within developing countries, work closely with the very
populations most severely affected by hunger and poverty. There is a very real concern that an
Article 27 liability and redress regime would have a negative effect on this relationship by
impeding public research on behalf of the poor. It is likely that any maximization of trade in
agricultural biotechnology for developing countries, by including speculative risks within an
Article 27 liability and redress regime, would be more than offset by detrimental effects caused
by such regime in reducing the amount and availability of agricultural biotechnology for the poor
in developing nations.322
From this perspective, it would appear that an Article 27 liability and redress regime
would have an adverse impact on biological diversity, the environment, and on human health
within developing and less developed countries should such a regime proceed. Based on the
MDGs, the choice that enhances social welfare most would appear to be the "no liability option"
– i.e no international liability and redress regime addressing speculative risks for biological
diversity, environmental harm, and long-term human health.
Turning now to examine welfare enhancement between the proposed Article 27 liability
and redress regime and the use of an import barrier, it is important to understand that under the
WTO agreements, such a barrier would likely not be allowable. If a developing or less
developed country perceived that an import barrier was economically justifiable to prevent
322
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speculative risks, there are no special provisions under either the Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary
(SPS) Agreement or the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement of the WTO that would
allow such a barrier to be put in place. Any country intending to implement an import barrier
against agricultural biotechnology would have to justify the reason for doing so, using either the
SPS or TBT agreements. Import barriers that are implemented outside of the SPS and TBT
agreements are trade distorting.
A country wishing to impose an import barrier has two main options, tariffs or quotas. A
tariff is simply a tax that the importing government places on a specific good or the goods from a
specific country. This makes the price of the good more expensive in the importing country, thus
lowering demand for that good. The effect on the exporting country will be to lower the volume
of that good available for export as the price to exporters will be lower, thus lowering production.
If the tariff is high enough, it is capable of stopping trade.
When an importing country imposes an import quota, the country restricts the level of a
particular good entering the country to a fixed amount. The economic effect in the importing
country is that demand for the product is higher than the supply of the product, thereby raising
the price of the product. In the exporting country, production will decline due to the lower level
of total exports. Global prices tend to vary more widely under quotas than under tariffs.
A country seeking to avoid any speculative harm to biological diversity, the environment
or human health by using an import barrier may well be in violation of the SPS and/or the TBT
Agreements. Assuming that a country would choose to comply with the WTO Agreements, such
compliance removes the option of using an import barrier, as the use of such a barrier would be a
violation. Factors that distort trade – such as violations of WTO Agreements -- have been shown
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to reduce social welfare.323 A country that complies with the WTO Agreements will not distort
trade and, thereby, will not diminish social welfare.
On the other hand, assuming the country would choose not to comply with the WTO
Agreement, countries can use the BSP to inhibit trade even if an Article 27 liability and redress
regime exists. Under the BSP, the importing country has relatively unfettered power to allow or
disallow the import of transgenic crops and animals. And whatever the importing country
decides has no effective challenge because the BSP has no enforcement mechanism.324
Consequently, it is not at all clear that any incentive to engage in trade that an Article 27 liability
and redress regime may have for certain countries will in fact result in increased trade. The
Article 27 liability and redress regime is more likely to be a disincentive to engaging in
agricultural research for the benefit of the poor without any offsetting advantage of welfare
maximization through increased trade.325 In light of this likely consequences, from a social
323
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welfare maximization perspective, the best option appears to be the “no option,” – i.e. that is, to
have no international liability and redress regime addressing biological diversity, environmental,
and long-term human health damage.
Hence, both Holtby Thesis assumptions seem dubious. Including speculative risks within
an Article 27 liability and redress regime is likely to reduce social welfare, even if trade occurs,
because of its negative impact on public research. Moreover, an Article 27 liability and redress
regime may well have this negative impact without any offsetting gain from increased trade
because the BSP gives so much discretionary and unchallengeable power to the importing
country. Rethinking two of the conditions within the Holtby Thesis would appear to indicate
that an international liability and redress regime under Article 27 of the BSP would not be
welfare enhancing. This would certainly be apparent when taken in context of the United
Nation's Millennium Development Goals.
Administrative Liability
Although the BSP creates administrative processes for the transboundary movement of
transgenic organisms,326 the BSP does not create any administrative liabilities. The BSP does not
create an international regulatory agency nor specify any penalties for disregarding the
administrative processes created by the Protocol. The only liability encompassed within the BSP
is the Article 27 liability and redress regime – a civil liability regime. Hence, the BSP has no
administrative liability for this article to discuss.
Criminal Liability
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The BSP does not have any provisions authorizing criminal liability. Hence, the BSP has
no criminal liability for this article to discuss.
Conclusion
As the BSP negotiations regarding an international liability and redress regime continue
to move forward, it appears that there is a very substantial downside of such an agreement for
public researchers, particularly in developing and less developed countries. This article has
shown that the domestic liability regimes in Denmark and Germany have created considerable
concern about the development of the biotechnology industry in both countries. If liability
regimes focused on agricultural biotechnology raise considerable concern in developed countries,
the effects may well be magnified for developing and less developed countries should a liability
and redress regime focused on agricultural biotechnology be implemented internationally.
Biotechnology has been identified as but one of the tools capable of assisting the
developing world in moving away from extreme poverty. Given that two of the eight goals of the
United Nation's MDGs are the eradication of extreme poverty and environmental sustainability,
the implementation of an international liability and redress regime may be very counterproductive towards the achievement of these goals. Integration of those afflicted by poverty into
innovative research technologies requires the availability of more tools and options, not fewer, as
would likely be the case under a liability and redress regime.
Taking into account the legal and economic considerations of an Article 27 liability and
redress regime, the “appropriate elaboration” for Article 27 is the “no option” – that is, there
should be no international liability and redress regime for the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol.
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